Dear Professor Bundy:

In a speech to the American Management Association on January 31, 1962, you asked for citizen “interest, action, understanding and support" for our government's efforts to better international relations. We agree that our government should work urgently for improved relations with other nations, and that all citizens ought to make serious efforts to understand and to support such a program. But, at this critical moment, we find ourselves unable to fulfill this important duty because we are unable to understand our government's stated policy in Southeast Asia.

As educators we feel a special responsibility in this regard because our duty to society requires us to help our fellow citizens understand the role of the United States in the world today. We have, moreover, an added responsibility because several members of the nation's community of scholars, yourself among them, who serve the government at the policy making level, do so in fulfillment of the intellectual and moral standards which the public rightfully associates with the academic community. As scholars we are accustomed to questioning and discussing our colleagues' views the better to understand them. Yet we, together with the entire American public, have had no opportunity to hear fully and to examine critically the views of yourself and other scholars who now help to guide our government's policy in Southeast Asia.

Up to now, we have not been able to develop our own views on United States policy in Southeast Asia because that policy has been revealed only piecemeal by a series of military actions. Nevertheless, we are determined to exercise our right to examine this policy critically and to discuss it publicly. For this reason we, the undersigned, urge you to come before the academic community in an open meeting here and explain and discuss with us the assumptions, intentions and goals which guide the United States and its conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. If the afternoon and evening of April l8th is a convenient time, we would appreciate an early acceptance of our invitation or, if this date proves inconvenient, we would be obliged if you would suggest another at your earliest convenience. We are aware of course, of the urgent demands on your time, but we believe that a public accounting of the government's policy in Southeast Asia represents a prior claim on the time of those who guide this policy.

We believe that such an accounting will allow us, in fact, to discuss with you at least the following questions as well as others raised by the recent "White Paper."

Who is the enemy? Although we have not declared war, we are engaged in military action against insurgent groups in South Vietnam and against the territory of North Vietnam and Laos. In some instances, United States aircraft have attacked or supported an attack on undisclosed targets, so that the specific "enemy" is not even indicated.

Who are our allies? On September 30, 1963, before the World Affairs Conference, Albany, New York, you said that "...it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise questions about the ability of the Government and the people of South Vietnam to support each other effectively in their contest with Communism....It is and must be the policy of the United States Government to make clear its interest in whatever improvements it judges to be necessary, always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest in the first instance upon the people of South Vietnam." What "improvements" in the popular base of the South Vietnam government, clearly required now more than ever, do you judge to be necessary? How are they likely to come about? Is it possible that the Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and the people of South Vietnam do "support each other effectively?"

Under what conditions would the United States support the participation of the Liberation Front in a future government of South Vietnam, or encourage negotiations toward such participation? Would we continue, for example, to support the Mekong Delta project in the event that the Liberation Front participated in a future government of South Vietnam?

What kind of proof must North Vietnam provide to convince us that that country is not intervening or has ceased to intervene in South Vietnam? How will this proof be validated? Is the United States willing and able to offer some kind of quid pro quo?

President Johnson has said that "no negotiated settlement in Vietnam is possible, as long as the Communists hope to achieve victory by force." On another occasion he said that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the Geneva agreement of 1954. Does this mean that, if the Communists should seek victory by the ballot box, we would support all-Vietnam free elections in accordance with these agreements?

According to the Office of Public Services, Department of State document, Situation in Viet-Nam, "our and the Vietnamese response (to the provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime) was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for aggression in South Viet-Nam and was thus entirely defensive in nature." Why has this military policy in South Vietnam recently undergone a change? Why do some bombings of North Vietnam fail now to be even so limited? How does this policy justify the bombing of radar installations at the northern border of North Vietnam, a direction which has no bearing on military action in South Vietnam? Some commentators have concluded that the hidden agenda of our policy is to provoke China into action which would allow the United States to bomb targets in that country. Is there any substance to this assertion?

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,