Norman Johnson Oral History Interview, November 29, 2016

Samuel Schmieding: Good afternoon, this is Dr. Samuel J. Schmieding, Oregon State University College of Forestry, Forest Ecosystems and Society Department. It is November 29, 2016. I am here in Strand Hall with Dr. K. Norman Johnson, Professor of Forestry. Professor of Forestry, correct?

Norman Johnson: Yeah, I'm Professor of Forest Resources.

SS: Professor of Forest Resources in the College of Forestry, Oregon State University. We are going to be doing an oral history interview here today that's part of the Northwest Forest Plan Oral History Project funded by the PNW Station. So, we'll get started here right now. Norm, I start every interview with basically the same question, where were you born and raised? Just kind of give me a biographical sketch of how it all started.

NJ: Okay, born in Berkeley, California, in 1942. And lived in the Bay area until 00:01:00I went to college, lived with my family in the Bay area, both in Berkeley and a place called Walnut Creek, and went to the University of California at Berkeley, in their forestry program. I actually started in engineering, but I switched to forestry, a very small, very good program, went there, and got interested in forest economics. Then began a master's program there, but I was in the largest draft of the Vietnam War, the largest call-up. But it turned out, I had a medical disability. And after that happened and the trauma of all that, I dropped out and took a job with the Klamath Indian Trust, which was a trustee 00:02:00for the remaining part of the Klamath Reservation that had not been sold.

SS: During the termination era, right? [1950s/1960s]

NJ: Yeah. During the termination era. That part hadn't been sold, and I worked there for two years and then went to a master's program at Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin. And then, I had a series of personal tragedies when I was back there. As a result, although I got a Master's of Science, I didn't finish a thesis.

SS: And this was, explain what happened? NJ: Well, I don't necessarily want to get into it.

SS: Oh, okay, I'm sorry.

NJ: It's just a personal tragedy. A couple of personal tragedies in my family.

SS: Oh, okay, all right.

NJ: I then came out to take care of my mother, stayed with her for about six 00:03:00months, applied to Oregon State, and ended up here in 1968 as a grad student. I got under John Beuter and studied forest economics, and got a Ph.D. in Forest Management. In the process, I got very interested in harvest scheduling, and began building computer-based, harvest- scheduling models. I built some for various studies Beuter and I did, something called the Beuter Report that was pretty well-known in its day about the future of forestry in Oregon. But I had just finished my degree here, and I didn't like staying at the same place where I got my Ph.D., so I went to Utah State and the faculty there. It's at Utah 00:04:00State that I developed the model called FORPLAN, a linear, programming-based, harvest-scheduling model. About that time, in the mid '70s, the National Forest Management Act [1976] was passed. The national forests had to develop new forest plans. It turned out that after a brief discussion, the Forest Service decided to require the use of FORPLAN for all forest planning analysis.

SS: So, your little method, your model in essence, got incorporated in after the 1976 act, correct?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Okay.

NJ: It became the major vehicle for thinking through national forest plans, and it's lived in infamy ever since. And at that time, the allowable cuts were the 00:05:00"coin of the realm." So, I became very well-known in forestry for harvest scheduling and allowable cuts. I was at Utah State for a while, I then went to Colorado State, partly because at Fort Collins where Colorado State is, was a think-tank for forest planning, and enabled me to be at the university and also work in forest planning there.

SS: And you also have some government agency connections there, too, at CSU, Fort Collins?

NJ: Fort Collins, absolutely. That's where the main computer facility was for the Forest Service. FORPLAN was overwhelming it, so I ended up over there to help. Then in '85, I returned here to Oregon State.

SS: Now, going back a little bit further, when you were growing up in the East 00:06:00Bay, or east of the East Bay, Walnut Creek, that area, what experiences did you have in nature that may have led you to have a career that was interested in natural resource management and analysis?

NJ: My family, every summer, would go up to a cabin that I loved, and a lake called Dark Lake. It's up near Lake Tahoe, it's a small lake with cabins. I really loved it up there. Then, we met a Forest Service person whose name escapes me, who was staying in one of the cabins, and he talked about a potential career in forestry, outdoors and such, and so, I became interested in that. But I still started as an engineer at Cal-Berkeley, and then soon transferred into forestry.

SS: Now, aside from Lake Tahoe, is there any other special places that made an especially strong reaction on you?

NJ: Well, I just want to say, it wasn't Lake Tahoe.

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: It was about-it was on this side [western] of the range. [Sierra Nevada]

SS: Oh, so it was on the west slope, going up toward --- [the crest].

NJ: West slope, and some small lakes. There are cabins on some of them, and you could hike there.

SS: Okay, small lakes and cabins and -- ?

NJ: We'll see if anybody wants it, why don't you shut that off for a minute?

(Break in audio - changed location)

SS: Anyway, we're back on. We had to take a brief break. Norm was talking about favorite places in nature. He was talking about a place that was just outside of Lake Tahoe, and he's going to kind of continue along that path.

NJ: Well, this was Dark Lake, and it's on the west side of the Crystal Range. On the other side is Fallen Leaf Lake, and Tahoe is on the west side. We used to hike up there and wander through the forest, and I really liked that. I got 00:08:00interested through meeting someone from the Forest Service, who talked to me about the future. And so, it was in the back of my mind, but I didn't really have other places or experiences in nature, of great value to me, when I was growing up. It was pretty focused on the Dark Lake area.

SS: Okay. Do you remember seeing anything that indicated a specific land management dynamic, pollution, disturbance event, or anything that made an impression on you about natural resource management, or lack thereof, or something that you maybe later on could refer to?

NJ: Well, just one. On the road we drove in on, we went there like fifteen years before I went off to other things, every summer for two weeks. One time, we went across where there had just been a clear-cut, and I found that shocking on a 00:09:00national forest. It was in an old-growth stand, so there was all this debris everywhere, and we didn't like that too much. We used to be out there fishing, and there were all these cattle grazing. They were very benign, but that I really identified cattle with that country that wandered through the forest with bells on.

SS: Now, this was, at that elevation, you're talking about a mixed fir- [forest]?

NJ: That's like at 7,500 feet.

SS: Oh, so you're in a fir and hemlock?

NJ: Well, it's fir, yeah.

SS: All fir? Okay.

NJ: Different kinds of fir, pretty much, maybe some mountain hemlock. But, yeah, it's high up there. Red fir was the big deal, and they didn't get much out of that, selling wood. At any rate, other than that, no, I didn't have many experiences. I was not a Boy Scout. I did not go to summer camps.

SS: So, how do you think that your formative years, and I won't say lack 00:10:00thereof, but relative lack of real immersion in nature, how do you think that affected how you view what you wanted to do with your career, and then, how your career developed?

NJ: I didn't know what I wanted to do, other than I had that one experience with someone I mentioned, in forestry. So, I didn't have a very good idea of what I wanted to do. But, I did moderately well in my high school in engineering. I don't really know why I chose engineering at this stage; I don't know why. But I didn't last long in engineering, mainly because I had enormous trouble with the German language and learning German.

SS: So, it wasn't the math or the physics, it was -- ?

NJ: Yeah, just the language. Forestry was one of the few programs at Berkeley 00:11:00that did not have a language requirement.

SS: And this was what year again, remind me? You said at the very start.

NJ: This is from 1960 when I went there, and by '61, I was in forestry; 1961.

SS: Now, looking back at this, obviously, you're in '61, it's the year before Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, two years before the Wilderness Act, kind of pre-environmental age, in terms of how you were being exposed to professional forestry. How would you characterize it today, and how the field was presented to you?

NJ: Well, it was presented first, that foresters knew best, and that really, we were going to develop a future forest in which we controlled all disturbances.

SS: So, you very much understood the kind of humanistic attitude, we can control 00:12:00nature with good planning and multiple-use?

NJ: Oh, yeah. Yeah.

SS: You know, targeted in this specific way, managed in this, I won't say, perfect way, but in this really logical, systematic way, was going to yield greatest good for the greatest number?

NJ: Except, mainly timber harvest.

SS: Right.

NJ: Sustained yield of timber harvest yields all these benefits. Yeah, that's what was taught there. That's what I learned. Very much so. Although I didn't realize I was learning that, I was learning that to take that view.

SS: Now, you mentioned the name of one of your mentors. Was it Beuter?

NJ: Well, Beuter, my mentor, as in my undergraduate days, was Henry Vaux, who was a well-known forest economist and policy person, and he was my mentor at the undergraduate level. And then at the graduate level here at Oregon State, it was John Beuter, who was another economist.

SS: About Vaux, what do you remember he taught you, and the things that you took out of that beyond passing your classes and learning your topics?

NJ: Well, Hank Vaux taught me how to think like an economist, and economists 00:13:00think in a particular way, especially in terms of marginal analysis and looking at alternatives, and to understand benefits and costs. He taught me all of that. He helped me develop an ability to think that way. And then he also was a master at asking questions, something I've never been near as good at. And that ability, I grew to appreciate. So that was my beginning as a forest economist.

SS: So, how did you see forest economics being taught 20-25-30 years later at Oregon State, in the context of remembering those initial exposures and your initial training?

NJ: Oh, I think it has been taught almost exactly as I learned it.

SS: Still?

NJ: Yeah, in terms of those fundamental concepts.

SS: The purely economic and numerical?

NJ: Yeah, just a notion about marginal analysis and benefits in costs and development of alternatives in their evaluation. That's still the way economics is taught. There may be a different way of valuing things, but it is still taught that way.

SS: So, what would you call the most important management principles of forestry and land management at that time?

NJ: Sustained yield of timber harvest. Everything was organized around that.

SS: Was the concept of ecology ever mentioned?

NJ: Yeah, I took ecology.

SS: Okay.

NJ: But ecology, I did very well in it. At that time, it was really focused, 00:15:00especially with my professor, on how to get seedlings to grow. How do you understand the climate, the microclimate, and the environment, again, in order to get timber production. That was the focus in the ecology class.

SS: Interesting. And a lot of the paradigms and examples were from the early classic ecologists, Clements and those folks, and then bring it forward?

NJ: Actually, the book was by Daubenmire [Rexford-plant ecologist-Wash. St. Univ.], I think. So, it wasn't too much about; there were ideas of climax forests and things, but disturbances were not, disturbance ecology was not a strong part of it. There was the notion about climax equilibrium, so I guess, that is what we were talking about. But it really was focused on how to 00:16:00understand the environment in order to grow trees better.

SS: Kind of what you would expect?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: At that time, right.

NJ: I mean, how long ago was that? That is 55 years ago, just 55 or 54 years ago, I took ecology. The teacher, though, made everyone sit in alphabetical order. (Laughs)

SS: Do you still make your students do that?

NJ: No, but also,'61 and '62, were the last two years in which every male undergraduate was in ROTC every quarter, and out there marching on the parade ground.

SS: At Cal-Berkeley?

NJ: Yes. Once a week.

SS: Wow.

NJ: And then, of course, they kind of tried to burn down the buildings in ROTC.

SS: I was going to say, how many years later did they have the massive protests at Berkeley? [Vietnam War protests]

NJ: There's two. I was the last class to really go through the two years of ROTC.

SS: Interesting.

NJ: Yeah, I had a rifle I was issued, and I got to march wearing the uniform.

SS: But like you said before, you didn't go to 'Nam because you had a medical exemption?

NJ: Yes, yeah.

SS: So, your career develops in the late '60s, on your professional track you move around and eventually end up here back at Oregon State after a first stay. What do you remember about the change in culture and politics in that, shall we say, twenty years, fifteen years, leading up to what would become called the Forest Wars? [Political struggle over logging in NW.]

NJ: Well, we started in Moreland Hall right over here. It's next to the MU [Memorial Union campus center building]. It's right opposite, on that side of Moreland Hall. That's where the college of forestry was.

SS: Where? Close to what?

NJ: Right next to the Long House?

SS: Okay, right.

NJ: You been to the Long House at all?

SS: Yeah, the Indian one.

NJ: They started in the Quonset hut right next to Moreland, which is now right 00:18:00there behind Moreland, and that Quonset hut is where I was as a grad student.

SS: Really?

NJ: Yeah, in there. I was just in there today. But the difference was that in the Spring of '69 or the Spring of '70, was the first Earth Day, and the whole campus shut down. We all organized to learn about the environment. So, that was a big deal. The whole campus, for a day closed.

SS: It was 1970, actually.

NJ: Yeah, I thought so. It was.

SS: Gaylord Nelson, a Senator from Wisconsin, was kind of the political leader, but it was more organic than that, too. But yeah, it was 1970.

NJ: But at any rate, that was a big deal, and so it certainly seemed like something was different in the air.

SS: And what do you remember about seeing this happen, and of course, NEPA was 00:19:00the same year.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: I mean, January 1[1970], it was signed into law by Richard Nixon, of all people. Did you have any idea that what was going to happen was going to happen? In other words, no longer were Forest Service and [other] agencies able to, shall we say, impose the economic model that you were trained in on lands without public input. I mean, could you see that coming, or did it kind of come over like a wave? NJ: Well, when I took forest policy in 1965, there were no environmental laws. So, what we learned as forest policy was mainly trespass law and land development law. So no, I didn't see this coming at all in 1970. Now, 00:20:00by the early '70s, with the Bitterroot Report and other reports, there was obviously a citizen uprising going on about managing the national forests. I didn't think though, it would necessarily change the management model, it was just that you were going to have to account for it. So, I didn't see it as fundamentally changing things.

SS: You didn't see that it was a tsunami that was eventually, over fifteen to twenty years, going to do what it did. Correct?

NJ: No, no.

SS: Now, when the Endangered Species Act was passed in '73, was that also just something, you said, okay? Or did you --?

NJ: I didn't hardly notice it.

SS: Didn't hardly notice it. Clean Water [Act] and all those?

NJ: Clean Water Act, yes, because that influenced the state, led to the creation of the Oregon State Forest Practices Act in '71.

SS: Right.

NJ: So, that one I knew, that one was in the air. But the Endangered Species Act 00:21:00seemed a pretty foreign idea, not going to influence things.

SS: Now, if you were going to characterize the evolution of the major forest planning acts that would affect, shall we say, the pre-Northwest Forest Plan Act going really to, back to '44, the Sustained Yield Act, in 1960, wasn't it the Multiple Use Act, and then '76, which was the big keystone leading up to what would happen later, the Forest Management Act of 1976. How would you characterize that evolution and what did those things do well, and what maybe did they not do, or maybe not account for?

NJ: Well, the 1944 Act was sustained-yield at the apex. It said in it that sustained-yield provides all the multiple-use of benefits. And so, that was 00:22:00really the apex of sustained-yield, and trying to institutionalize it across owners. It, in the end, didn't have much impact. But the Multiple Use Act [1960] didn't mean much. That just codified what the Forest Service was doing, and left it almost unlimited discretion to do it.

SS: But didn't it underscore a little more that recreation should have a little higher niche in the multiple use portion of the eight categories, or whatever? There was like six or eight categories.

NJ: Well, it's true that the Forest Service was in a battle for the Park Service to be the nation's recreationists. But it didn't in any fundamental way alter the primacy of timber production.

SS: Now, the '76 act. What did that do that was different?

NJ: But let me just say about the Wilderness Act, which is--

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: The Wilderness Act was very important for two reasons. First off, it really 00:23:00tried to divide up the forest into two parts, which had been going on informally, but this formalized that idea.

SS: In other words, the primitive areas [U.S. Forest Service] that were just marked off, but it was formalizing and putting more rules on those?

NJ: And the rest was for timber production. That's how it was interpreted, so dividing things up.

SS: Exactly.

NJ: But also, it called for a review of roadless areas adjacent to wilderness, which the Forest Service took to mean review of roadless areas everywhere. That was a third of the national forests, and they got stuck in the goo of road-less areas, and couldn't get out. The result, the national forests are getting pretty well hammered out in the roaded areas, which I think added to the discontent of people. The Forest Service got stuck in the road-less quandary and tried all these times to fix it, and never could. So, I think the Wilderness Act, not only 00:24:00did it identify the value of wilderness, it helped contribute to public discontent with how the Forest Service was managing the rest of the area.

SS: Because that was RARE I, and there was RARE II. [Roadless Area Review and Evaluations]

NJ: Yeah.

SS: And they took forever, and they never really got finished, did they?

NJ: No.

SS: Because RARE II was in the '80s, wasn't it?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: And RARE I was '71-'72, when they started.

NJ: RARE I had the misfortune to be started before NEPA, but completed after it was done. That had real impact and created some of the negative perceptions by the public. Getting up to the National Forest Management Act, by that time, I was sponsored by timber management in the Forest Service to build planning models for them. And they liked me a lot. I built planning models, and partly 00:25:00because it showed how to maintain sustained-yield and still have a pretty health timber harvest, a sustained yield of timber production. As the result, and by that time I was at Utah State, I was doing various analyses of the National Forest Management Act, and one of mine which got written up in the Congressional Record, was cautioning the Senate that the act they were passing was somewhat imperfect, and then, the day after that, they passed it, 92 to nothing.

SS: So much for your advice, right?

NJ: So I was working for the national forests, and timber management was all-powerful in those days. What happened then was, the head of timber management, Don Funk, took a liking to me, and they began to really promote my 00:26:00models as the way you do planning in the national forests. Then, a committee of scientists was formed to help the secretary of agriculture write the regulations, and for implementing the act. The range rep was Thad Box, who was my dean, and one of my other teachers from Berkeley was Dennis Teagarden, an economist, and he was on it. Because of the two of them, I became a consultant to the committee of scientists. And I was just an assistant professor, but I really knew this harvest scheduling stuff.

SS: For a lay person, how would you describe your models in terms of forest economics?

NJ: My models?

SS: If you were going to give a sketch of maybe one or two of your models of specific plans, how would you describe it?

NJ: For the models, what I was doing, I was figuring out, given the forest that existed and its potential growth rate and different restrictions on it to reach goals like recreation or wildlife, my models helped find the maximum sustained harvest level that could occur. That's what the models did. And then you'd change, maybe you'd allocate more land to wilderness and less to timber production, or maybe you'd change the way timber production was done. You'd do it, rerun the model, and see the results. I did a lot of that. That's what those models were. It was simple in concept, but by this time, there were a lot of 00:28:00these other considerations you tried to factor in.

Even though in retrospect, the model didn't fit very well with the problem, if the problem is protection of biodiversity, because the models generally didn't have a very significant spatial component. Still, that's what was being done, and what I was doing. So, the National Forest Management Act was passed to reign in timber production. That's what it was all about. My models were how you were going to calculate how much harvest level you needed, so I was deeply involved with the committee of scientists to help interpret the National Forest Management Act, which led to the 1979 and then '82 planning rules [U.S. Forest Service], which only in 2012 was replaced. From 1982 to 2012, that was the rule for 30 years.

SS: How would you characterize the '76 Act, its strengths and weaknesses?

NJ: Well, it was an attempt to reign in timber production. That was its purpose, to really reform timber production.

SS: So, it was a recognition things were going too much toward production?

NJ: Oh, yes.

SS: Okay.

NJ: But Congress didn't intend to upset the apple cart. That was very clear. They didn't see it as a revolutionary act. Still, it was going to be sustained-yield, multiple-use. But the way the regulations were written, they laid within them the seeds for major change, the number one aspect of it, for purposes of the Northwest Forest Plan, was the viability rule.

SS: The viability clause?

NJ: Yeah, viability clause.

SS: And describe what the viability clause, in your words, what that is, and why it was important?

NJ: Well, the viability clause basically stated that you needed to have habitat 00:30:00to support viable populations of native vertebrates well-distributed across the planning area. [Endangered Species Act + species viability in general.]

SS: And this is, of course, where the spotted owl and the animals that were later, very shortly thereafter, listed under the ESA, correct, and that's how they got attached?

NJ: Well, actually, not quite.

SS: Okay.

NJ: That rule applied to anything with vertebrae, whether or not they were threatened or endangered.

SS: Okay.

NJ: Basically, what happened is that the agency could not develop scientifically credible approaches to conserve these species and to provide habitat for viable 00:31:00populations. They were unable to do that. But that became the dominant consideration all through the Northwest Forest Plan; that was this habitat for viable populations, now for all species, not just vertebrates, were spread, well-distributed, over the planning area. So, that particular clause in the regulation swamped everything else.

SS: And that's the one that caused all the issues in the '80s as the Forest Service, the BLM, the Fish and Wildlife.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: And all the stuff got tied up together, the listings and all that stuff? And it had to do with the viability clause and interpretations of it? Correct?

NJ: The management had to do with the viability clause, but what happened along the way, was when a species got in enough difficulty that it was listed, then a 00:32:00separate process started to deal with the listing and what would happen. But the viability clause was important and a driver without ESA. And really, it was the viability clause much more than ESA, that drove all of it under the Northwest Forest Plan. It was the viability clause, and the Forest Service's inability to develop a scientifically-credible approach to protecting the vertebrates to meet the viability clause. It just so happens that the northern spotted owl became the poster child for all of that because of its very wide-ranging requirements, and because they were in the mature, old-growth forests. Those are big home 00:33:00ranges. So, they were really the fly in the ointment of continuing harvest of old growth.

SS: And the fact that they are, shall we say, a charismatic mega-fauna, probably adds to the mix, right?

NJ: Yeah, absolutely. SS: I mean, if the murrelet was the first bird that came out, it wouldn't have been as sexy in terms of the symbolism. Right?

NJ: No, not at all.

SS: I don't want to tell Marty that, right? (Laughs)

NJ: Yeah.

SS: But that's Martin Raphael. [Lead Scientist on NWFP; focus on murrelet]

NJ: Oh, I know who.

SS: No, I know that, I'm talking for the record.

NJ: Oh, I see.

SS: I know you know who he is. Now, before the Northwest Forest Plan and the general era encompassed by, it could be said that science was used in the service of timber and the economic goals. How would you describe the paradigm shift towards science that became almost primary in terms of how decisions were made and legal paradigms were met?

NJ: Another kind of science. There's a science behind inventory and growth and 00:34:00yield, and there's a science there, too. But it was at one time, for 50-60 years, a very important science. But the problem changed, so it wasn't maximum sustained-harvest levels any more. It was providing habitat for viable populations. For that, you need a whole different set of scientists and science. And for quite a while, the Forest Service didn't realize that, and I didn't realize it.

SS: So, when was your realization point? When you got hit between the eyes, and said, wow, the game has changed? Was there a moment, or it was more of a long process?

NJ: When I came back to Oregon.

SS: Early '80s, right?

NJ: In '85.

SS: Okay.

NJ: The national forests were trying to complete their forest plans. They'd been trying to complete them for years. There was an incredible political controversy over what was going to happen, and thus, they were stuck because they couldn't satisfy enough people, enough politicians, to be able to publish their plans. And in 1986, there was a gubernatorial race. That gubernatorial race was between Neil Goldschmidt, who's fallen far away, and Norma Paulus. National Forest harvest levels were part of the controversy in that election, and part of their debates. Neil Goldschmidt, at one of his debates with Norma Paulus, said, "And 00:36:00there's this $10 million or something computer model that sets harvest levels that nobody understands, that's driving all this." Someone had told me that about FORPLAN. Well, as soon as he got elected --

SS: This was Goldschmidt, right?

NJ: Yeah. He made a commitment to have the state weigh in on the forest plans, a guy named Stub Stewart was one of his benefactors, from Bohemia [forest products company]. They asked if I'd go to work for them, and I had only been here six months, working from the university. I did [accept], and I started trying to develop plans for the state, working with state agencies, so they would have at least as high a harvest level as the [U.S.] Forest Service, and still meet these 00:37:00other goals. After trying that in three or four forests, I reached the realization it was impossible, that we were headed for a big fall in harvest levels, and I told the governor that. That's when I knew it. That was in '87, '88, that just isn't going to happen. You just can't do it [old model] anymore. Soon after that, I went back to the university. I told them, you just can't continue. We did a whole bunch of analysis, and a whole bunch of comments. I finally said, these west side forests were where it happened -- the Umpqua, the Willamette, and Mount Hood -- you just can't do that anymore.

SS: Siuslaw, too, right? Wasn't that one of them, too?

NJ: Yes. The Siuslaw, though, didn't trouble me as much as the others, because 00:38:00the Siuslaw doesn't have much old growth, and it has a very, very productive forest. And so, you can cover up a lot of sins with that.

SS: Because of the rapid regrowth rates?

NJ: Yeah, you didn't really have old growth, and we had public meetings all over the state. I finally concluded, you just can't get there from here. That's when I realized we were really headed for a big change. It was then.

SS: Now, what are the issues, magnified in any one area or in any one forest? I know the Willamette for many years was the number one [nationally] in terms of harvest, in terms of board-feet. Was it any more magnified there or any one forest, or was it just kind of spread out?

NJ: It was everywhere. It was just everywhere.

SS: And what was the problem that screamed out to you, why you said this can't 00:39:00continue like this?

NJ: Well, that given the management requirements to meet the viability clause, you couldn't maintain anywhere near the harvest level. You just couldn't do it. So, I just said to them, you can't, it isn't going to happen.

SS: And what was their response, or the governor's office response?

NJ: The governor's office response was pretty much to pull back from their deep involvement with the national forests.

SS: Okay, so they focused more on state lands after that point?

NJ: No, what happened was. Let me just say it. What happened was, I told them 00:40:00that, and soon thereafter came the ISC Report. You know it as the Thomas Report.

SS: In 1990, right, the one that Jack Ward Thomas oversaw and wrote? Right?

NJ: That came out. I was still with the governor's office then, right at the end. After I told them that, the Thomas Report came out. And that was really breathtaking, because that was the first time somebody, a group, had said to heck with the allowable cut, we're just going to find a scientifically credible plan for the northern spotted owl, and they did. And not only that, but that means you need different kinds of people worrying about the analysis, as 00:41:00allowable cuts and cutting models aren't the key. I mean, we're going through a very, in some small way, a revolution in resource management. And that's when I really knew, boy, the party's over.

SS: What do you remember about the environmental movement, the more assertive protests, people up in trees, and what do you remember about all that during the '80s, because it started to really accelerate up into the '90s?

NJ: That's when I learned that people can easily lose their minds over trees (laughs), that it's one of the most emotional connections people have, with big-old trees. Yeah, and so, we used to have public meetings that would go on for six hours. But the people in the communities liked that because the Forest 00:42:00Service wouldn't let them speak any more into the microphone. The Forest Service was so gun shy with being yelled at. So, at any rate, we were in the middle of a storm, I knew that, and it just seemed part and parcel, given their strong feelings, that they'd be up in the trees. Just like the loggers and the millworkers would be just beside themselves with what was going to happen to them and their families. I mean, it was a very difficult time, but it just wasn't clear how we were going to get out of this. It wasn't clear at all. The Thomas Report changed that. They said the scientists -- the wildlife scientists 00:43:00especially -- are going to have a big role in the future, when they had almost no role before that.

SS: So, from the time that you read that, you knew that it was a game-changer, but how did you get involved, and how did the Gang of Four -- I know how it was named -- but still, how did that whole process start?

NJ: How was it named?

SS: It was named by a timber industry person, kind of a pejorative term, right?

NJ: I think it was named by Kathie Durbin. [One story about origin]

SS: The reporter for The Oregonian?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Oh. I've read that it was a pejorative term by some timber person.

NJ: Well, it could be. [Timber industry person; from Jerry Franklin interview]

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: But it certainly wasn't us.

SS: No, I know that. What did you guys think of that, the Gang of Four name?

NJ: I mean, we had these long names.

SS: It's kind of like the Four Horseman of the Apocalypse, like the Notre Dame Backfield [iconic football backfield in 1920s/cultural reference].

NJ: We had this long name, Scientific Committee for the Late Successional Forests or something like that. Oh, you know, things were just happening. You 00:44:00didn't have a strong sense of being in control. So, you'd just go with the flow, yeah. But what happened there is the Thomas Committee, and the Thomas Report came out. Election. Goldschmidt doesn't run again. Roberts, what was her name? Her first name? Barbara Roberts.

SS: Barbara Roberts.

NJ: There's also a Betty Roberts, so I get them confused. She came into office. I had gone back just before.

SS: Was she governor then?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Oh, okay, right.

NJ: She was governor during the development of the Northwest Forest Plan. You 00:45:00know, they wanted me to serve as the Oregon State Rep on the recovery, Spotted Owl Recovery Plan, and by then, I said, "No, there's a much bigger issue than that." So, what happened is that the "Gang of Four" was put together by two people. I don't know if, is it fair to ask, has Franklin's talked to you about that? How it was put together?

SS: Yeah, but go ahead.

NJ: Did he talk about that?

SS: Somewhat, but tell me your recollection if it? Yeah, he talked about it.

NJ: It was put together by Jim Lyons and John Beuter.

SS: Oh, I'm not sure he told me that, but okay.

NJ: Jim Lyons was the forestry advisor for the Ag Committee which shares jurisdiction with the Interior Committee, or did, on the national forests.

SS: Oh, he did mention Jim Lyons, now I recall.

NJ: But the other person was John Beuter.

SS: Here at Oregon State, correct?

NJ: No, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Agriculture [at that time].

SS: Oh, so he had moved up from his days here. He's the guy that you knew from Oregon State, correct?

NJ: Yeah. So, Lyons was working for the House under Kika de la Garza (D-Texas), Chairman of the Ag Committee. Lyons was a Democrat. Beuter was working for a Republican administration, the first Bush. So, they got together and convinced their bosses this was a good idea, and so, they got the four of us [Gang of Four]. They got Thomas, of course, because he knew about owls. But this is really an old-growth issue, so they got Franklin. They got me because I knew harvest levels. And they got John Gordon because; go ahead -

SS: No. (Continue)

NJ: - John Gordon has the "voice of God," He had been department head here and in one other department. Beuter was another. And he [Gordon] had been Jim Lyons' mentor at Yale.

SS: And Jerry said something about John. He says, "John's the closest thing we had to a forest ambassador." I think he described him as that and the voice, his sonorous, James Earl Jones-ish voice. Yes.

NJ: Stop it for a second. (Break in Audio) And so, those two people got together and put together this group, this team. And do you want me to talk about that?

SS: Yeah, absolutely.

NJ: Then we went to Congress and talked to them. First off, they wanted a plan, 00:48:00and my dean at the time said, "You can do this, but you've got to come up with alternatives." Which is what I wanted to do anyway. Additionally, he mentioned fish; "Don't let's get surprised by some damn fish." I knew we didn't have fish people involved. So, and it's kind of convoluted, but just to get to the punch line, I called up Gordie Reeves, as he may have told you. I said, "Come and help us just for a little bit."

SS: The "Gang of Four Plus Two," in other words.

NJ: Yeah. And that's what got them involved.

SS: Sedell, too, Jim Sedell.

NJ: I didn't ask for Jim Sedell. Anyway, so I asked Gordie Reeves to come and help. He asked Jim Sedell. And that really was the beginning of what's become 00:49:00the aquatic conservation strategies, as probably Reeves told you about. At any rate, we were given, there's a letter, the request. It's at the back of the "Gang of Four" report from Congress. Yeah, I believe you have the letter at the back. It is, there's a letter at the back. (Both looking at copy of "Gang of Four" report.)

SS: Well, I copied all the pages you gave me, Norm.

NJ: Yeah, just look at the very back.

SS: Yeah, let me see what we got here. Let me turn this off. (Break in audio.) We are looking at the May 22, 1991 letter from the Congress to Dr. Johnson, and basically, as a follow-up, as it says, to the hearings that you took a part in, right? NJ: Yes. Jim Lyons, Franklin and I wrote this letter. Jim Lyons was the aide to Kika de la Garza, one of the signatories. The letter was important 00:50:00because it did change from asking for a plan to asking for alternatives, which is what we wanted. We did not want to propose a plan that-

SS: So, in other words, they first asked for a plan.

NJ: Because the Thomas Committee had given a plan. The Thomas Committee didn't give alternatives.

SS: So, in other words, the singular thing that would be the plan versus a range, an array, if you will.

NJ: Multiple plans with different characteristics, yeah.

SS: Right.

NJ: So, but what was real important here, is that it said, "We encourage you to solicit the assistance of others that may be helpful in this endeavor, including resources and personnel from the Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management. To facilitate this request, we are writing the heads of each of those agencies to request their cooperation in this regard." And when 00:51:00they said that, that was carte blanche to involve all these specialists.

SS: The "ologists," if you will.

NJ: Yeah. Also, this now is about alternatives. And while it may not say it in this letter, they wanted it done in three weeks. And we took six weeks.

SS: Is this the one that where you also, where Jerry got you guys together at the [Portland Memorial] Coliseum?

NJ: Jerry and Jack.

SS: Jerry and Jack got you together in the Coliseum in Portland, right? I mean, it was like a year or two before FEMAT, before the Clinton Summit, right?

NJ: Yeah, it was. And that's where they mapped the old growth, and mapped key watersheds, and in a week or in six days. Congress then realized there was more 00:52:00to these forests than the northern spotted owl, and they wanted to get to the punch line. "Specifically, we ask you to evaluate different approaches for taking ecologically significant old growth and late successional ecosystems species and processes, including, but not confined to spotted owls." They knew there was more to it. They just wanted to get to the punch line, and so, they asked this group to analyze it. And we, in kind of a wild, crazy six weeks, we produced this report. My kids helped me put the copies of it together.

SS: So, how would you characterize the collaborative dynamic regarding this report, which I believe involved the Forest Service, BLM, Fish and Wildlife, but also academics, correct? As that would be those four, and maybe even State of 00:53:00Oregon and Washington officials, as well, or was it?

NJ: Yeah. Well, first off, I want to say, it didn't involve any agencies at all.

SS: Okay.

NJ: It only involved people within them.

SS: Okay, I got you.

NJ: But not the agencies.

SS: Okay, right.

NJ: And so, in that way, it's the one report in all of this that doesn't have an agency imprint, which is why you weren't given it. (Laughs) That's why.

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: To be blunt about it. This report was totally -

SS: It doesn't have a flag of-doesn't have Smokey's flag or -- ?

NJ: No, it doesn't have anything. It was the really, it was an outlaw effort, outside the bounds of the bureaucracy.

SS: Now, what do you say about why that was maybe special or different, or what this type of report without strictures of agency, politics and rules and paradigms, why was this maybe "outside the box" and maybe a really, truly novel 00:54:00and informative document?

NJ: Because what was going on there is that, unless you push the agencies aside, they were totally committed to all their timber sales and all their old-growth sales they had laid out. All of these things, and you were just smashing right through them. So, the Thomas Report was very helpful in starting that. But this continued it, and really, the agency had exhausted itself three times trying to come up with a spotted owl plan, and three times Judge Dwyer rejected it. And so, the inmates had taken over the prison. Basically, some of the Thomas Report was expanded, because in this one, we didn't come up with a plan. We came up with forty alternatives, and said, you guys pick the plan. We don't know, we've done all we can.

SS: I'd heard that during this whole process, including during, before and after 00:55:00the congressional hearings and these reports, that some of the leaders in the Forest Service, specifically Dale Robertson, became apoplectic.

NJ: Yeah, so did John Butruille. When we reported on this to Congress, I'll never forget sitting there on the bench at one of the hearings with Jim Sedell and Gordie Reeves. Looking up, Butruille, who is about eight feet tall, he's this ex-Marine with red hair, and his face was so red, it was just crimson.

SS: And he's with what?

NJ: He was Regional Forester, Region 6. [Pacific NW/Alaska]

SS: That's what I thought.

NJ: What he was mad about was them saying that the forest plans wouldn't protect fish. Dale Robertson had just gotten these awards from Trout Unlimited, and he was so mad. But luckily, as Reeves probably told you, such claims were in their 00:56:00own forest plans. They put in the fine print that this is going to degrade fish habitat. They'd said it. So, yeah, the Thomas Report, the agencies, I believe, felt was moderately under their control, but this [Gang of Four and process afterwards] was totally out of their control.

SS: They did not like that, did they?

NJ: No, and I can understand why. It's only when basically, a bureaucracy and the agency people, just run out of gas. They don't have the answer. Eventually, they have to give up and bring in other groups. That's what happened here. What is interesting is that we never got, I would challenge you to find any congressional criticism of this report. The Northwest delegation of Republicans and Democrats said, we asked you, and you told us, but the price is too high for 00:57:00us to allow legislation to pass on this. In the end, two proposals, one in Agriculture [Alternatives 8 and 8A], and one in Interior they kicked around, 12A. The numbers were not very different from where the Northwest Forest Plan ended.

SS: And now are you talking about numbers in terms of how many late successional old-growth forests would remain in reserve areas?

NJ: Yes, how much is in reserve, how wide the buffers will be, and all of that.

SS: And then, what would be "Matrix" lands? [From NWFP zoning scheme]

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Those terms were already ones that would come out in FEMAT and the Northwest Forest Plan. The terms were already being bandied around?

NJ: They were, and they came by and large from the Thomas Report, and were 00:58:00modified by this report [Gang of Four].

SS: "Adaptive Management Areas," also.

NJ: They came later. [Northwest Forest Plan zoning category]

SS: Later, that's what I thought.

NJ: There were no adaptive management areas in this. There were none in this. But the "matrix" came out of the Thomas Report, late successional [reserves] came out of this report. And so, what happened is that what was interesting about this report, is that we would not tell anyone. Jim Lyons called up and wanted to know what's going to be in it. And I said, "We're not telling you." We worked day and night up at the OSU Center, and some people joined us. All the maps were hand-drawn. There was no GIS to speak of. We had no agency support. We had no money. We had nothing. The OSU Center, I get for free because I'm faculty. So, we did that, and Congress, they didn't criticize us. But people 00:59:00like Congressman DeFazio were devastated at the results here.

SS: Of this?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Why was DeFazio devastated?

NJ: Because it meant, that for any reasonable hope of survival for these species and ecosystems, there was going to be a dramatic fall in harvest.

SS: And he recognized how that would affect the politics, the economics.

NJ: He recognized how that would affect his district.

SS: Yes, that's what I meant. I mean, he goes from Lane County and up here a little bit, but all the way down to Douglas and south.

NJ: But he never challenged us. It was a different era. We were kind of the wise men of the village, and they hired us to tell them the way things were, and we did. And then, John, as I think Jerry probably mentioned to you, John Gordon had 01:00:00the masterstroke of summarizing it for us.

SS: In Congress, you mean?

NJ: Yeah, with this.

SS: Right.

NJ: There's lots of maybe funny stories, but I'll just tell one of them.

SS: That's fine. The stories are a part of this process.

NJ: This, he gave me this.

SS: Okay.

NJ: But what was key was this last statement. And so, let me just say, that we'd written something John didn't like. He went off to write his own. We said, "Okay, John, what should we do?" Because he had been away for a bit, and he hadn't been at the final days back at Portland.

SS: He was back at Yale, the Dean of the College of Forestry?

NJ: No, actually, he was in Finland with his wife on vacation.

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: But (laughs), he spends a lot of time in Finland.

SS: Yeah, I know, he told me about that, too.

NJ: Did you interview him?

SS: Yes, I did. Up in Benson Towers, where he lives in Portland.

NJ: And so, we'd written something that he didn't think too much of, and I agreed, it didn't amount to much as a report. So we said, "What should we do? It's the night before the presentation." "Well, I'll [Gordon] go write something." And he wrote this. Franklin then said, "This is corny, especially this phrase I'm going to read you." Franklin rewrote it. Luckily, Gordon paid no attention to the rewrite. He just wrote what he did and read it. He said that current forest plans provided a high level of assurance for maintaining habitat for dependent species, and projected harvest levels of the state can be achieved. We'd described again a practical ecosystem approach to conserving biological diversity. But then he said the punch line, "We've provided a sound 01:02:00basis for decisions, given the time and information in which we operated. Science, at least as exemplified by the four of us and those who assisted us, has done what it can. The process of democracy must go forward from here." Congress realized we were just workers handing things off to them, and were not trying to make the decision for them. They really appreciated that.

SS: But they did not do anything final with this. Correct?

NJ: Oh, let me just backtrack and say-

SS: They passed the buck, but anyway.

NJ: That particular meeting with Congress was one of the few times congressmen came to a briefing as opposed to their staff. They came to hear it. And there was absolutely no knowledge even ten minutes before of what we were going to say. We had alerted no one. I was in charge of the information. I had congressmen coming in, trying to hang out and look over my shoulder, and I told them, "No, you can't see it." Well, I didn't work for them, I mean, what are 01:03:00they going to do to me? (Laughs) At any rate, but the two committees, and now Interior was sponsored as two and Ag, they developed proposals. They actually voted on them. The Speaker of the House was Tom Foley from -

SS: Washington?

NJ: He would not allow them to come to the floor for a vote.

SS: Because?

NJ: He didn't want a vote. He did not like the answers.

SS: Because he recognized that it would impact-

NJ: Yeah.

SS: The timber industry in his home state?

NJ: Well, he'd been talked to by the industry. However, it's also true that with 01:04:00this report piled on the Thomas Report, there was no going back. There was no going back.

SS: Now, did you guys received pressure from the timber industry?

NJ: Pressure?

SS: Or input or contact?

NJ: Oh, yeah, at the beginning of it.

SS: I mean, however you interpret that?

NJ: No, and let me tell you, not much. At the beginning, the industry was hanging around the Coliseum, too, and acted upset. But, no. Let me tell you why. They didn't believe anyone would take this seriously. These guys worked for six weeks and they're overturning something that took fourteen years, what are you talking about?

SS: And when you mean fourteen years, you're talking about-

NJ: The forest planning efforts.

SS: 1976 to '89 or '90. [Post-NFMA of 1976 planning dynamics]

NJ: Yeah.

SS: When they'd basically been working on these the whole time.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Okay.

NJ: And so, I believe, they didn't think anyone would take it seriously. They took this very seriously. And after that, after that, it was sort of downhill 01:05:00sledding to the Northwest Forest Plan. The big change happened between the Thomas Report and the Gang of Four, from a political standpoint of a sense of what was possible.

SS: And how would you characterize the political shift, whether it be out here amongst the citizenry, and also in the powers of Congress and the state governments and the like? How would you characterize that shift?

NJ: The shift was that the realization, as John Gordon said here, "There's no alternative that provides abundant timber harvest and high levels of habitat protection. There's no alternative that does that. You can't have them both." And it was clear where the law was. So, if you're not going to overturn these environmental laws, you're going to have a tremendous reduction in harvest. And there's no way out.

SS: Now, when you were involved with the process that produced this report, the 01:06:00hearing, did you perceive the size of the challenge ahead when you were first getting involved in this? And whether or not you did, when did you realize that this was really a big deal?

NJ: I realized it when I calculated the harvest levels with the different options, and realized that we went all the way from the low "L" to the "H" high. There was "Low to Medium," but there was no option with "L's," [Low] for some 01:07:00aspect of the environment, low levels of protection, that didn't have harvest levels about a third of historical levels. I remember sitting with a friend who was helping do the calculations up at the regional office, and I realized that. And you know, that was it. I expected there was no coming back from that. That's when I realized that the world had changed, and the way of thinking about it had changed. My goal at the time was to get to the bottom line as rapidly as possible, because all this uncertainty was killing everyone.

SS: And this is still before FEMAT?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Did you realize that even changing the parameters of your career in terms of 01:08:00your specialty as a forest economist, did you say, okay, I've got to now start including all these other variables in terms of what society, but also the law, will accept as legal and doable and acceptable?

NJ: That was kind of the end of my career as a forest economist and the beginning of my career such as it is, as somebody in planning and policy, because you can't separate them, whereas it once seemed like we could.

SS: So then, nothing really happens. You've got the injunctions, and Bush I leaves office. Clinton campaigns that he's going to take care of this, and he actually does. During the first two to three months of his administration, he had the Forest Summit. Now, were you at that summit?

NJ: No. I wasn't at that summit. I was the only member of the Gang of Four not 01:09:00speaking. I had the tradeoffs. I would have presented the tradeoffs, and they didn't want to see them at the summit. They thought it would be too discouraging for everyone.

SS: So, they wanted to see kind of a simple version of what?

NJ: Talk about the issues and they wanted upbeat and optimistic, and since the President's involved, we can't have bad news.

SS: Yeah. Wasn't the whole cabinet there, or most of them?

NJ: Yeah, right, and I would come in and showed them, look, this is the way it is, and then that would have blown the meeting apart.

SS: Been a downer, right?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: So, how would you have told them, if you were invited, what would you have said? Give me a one-paragraph synopsis.

NJ: John Gordon brought along our key slide for his presentation, and they wouldn't let him show it.

SS: Because of the same concerns? [Johnson agrees] Okay.

NJ: Yeah. So, I would have shown them what we found, and I had a neat little summary, one-page summary, just a graph, a very powerful graphic, and I would have showed them that. So, this is where we are now, so here's some choices. (Laughs)

SS: Now, was that a fair predictor of some of the economic tradeoffs?

NJ: Oh, totally. They're pretty much unchanged.

SS: Now, did you predict the, shall we say, and I'm using a nice word, the "disappointing" timber harvests under the Northwest Forest Plan?

NJ: Yeah, well, we -

SS: Did you see that coming?

NJ: Yeah, that was 1.2 billion [board feet]. That's where it ended up.

SS: So, you figured that was going to happen?

NJ: Yeah. I was sure of it by that time.

SS: Now this, you mean, by the time of FEMAT? [1993]

]NJ: By the time of the Timber Summit [1993], by the end of the Gang of Four 01:11:00[1992], and the reaction of the delegation to it, especially, I was convinced as to where we were headed. It was one of the options that Congress was going to consider till Foley stopped them. I don't mean to say I'm a know-it-all. I don't mean that. But it was clear that the party was over, if it was a party, and the harvest levels were going to fall precipitously.

SS: Independent of the formal plan?

NJ: No.

SS: Or because of the formal planning dynamic?

NJ: Well, by this time, there was an injunction on harvests in northern spotted owl habitat. And so, in terms of getting a release of that injunction, and also 01:12:00dealing with the fish issues, I knew where that was headed. It wasn't a mystery any more. And it wasn't a mystery to any of us involved.

SS: Now, coming from a traditional forest economics perspective, how did you see the other ways that people valued old-growth late-successional forests, seeing them as churches, as sacred spaces, as things that you heard about. I mean, you read poetry from some of the early American history, John Muir, and all that stuff that was out there, but it wasn't a broadly-held popular cultural thing, and how did you see the values entering into how forests had to be assessed from, let's say, Earth Day on?

NJ: But let me just say, that that is not what we were asked to do.

SS: No.

NJ: Nor not what we did. We had a very specific assignment which is captured here, but it's the same one in the wonderful words of those for FEMAT, but about 01:13:00evaluating a different approach to protecting ecological old growth and late successional ecosystems and species and processes, including, but not confined, to the spotted owls. We were not asked in any way to consider the emotional attachment people have to forests in the Gang of Four report or in FEMAT. Now, that was a flaw.

SS: I'm asking you personally.

NJ: Oh.

SS: I understand what was in the reports, I'm just asking you personally as a forest economist who evolved over time as society is evolving.

NJ: Oh, yeah, okay.

SS: Sorry, I should have made it more clear about that, because we are mired in this stuff. But just personally, how did that perception come to you, as you said, wow, these other values are, all of a sudden, a much bigger deal than they were when I was first trained?

NJ: In '87, as Franklin may have told you, he came into my office. I didn't know 01:14:00him well. And by that time, I'd realized that the old-growth trees and forests are very special. I said to him, "Jerry, we just have to find a way to reserve the rest of the old-growth." And he thought I was crazy. I don't know whether he mentioned this to you. He tells the story often, and said that we can't do that. I said, "No, these forests are something different. And we need to find a way to reserve them, because they have value way beyond timber." So, yeah.

SS: So, you came to that realization even before Jerry, the "guru" of old growth, came to that realization? Is that fair to say?

NJ: Yeah. Although he knew about their importance before I did in all these ways. He just did not think it was possible to reserve them. And then the Times 01:15:00did a story on me that ended up on the front page of the local paper.

SS: The Gazette-Times? [Corvallis newspaper]

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Okay.

NJ: That said, here's a guy that spent his life thinking that sustained-yield would sustain all the forest values, and now he's realized it won't. It was during that period.

SS: Was that, I don't want to call it......was that like a crisis for you, or a moment of consciousness-shifting?

NJ: Yeah, I'll say.

SS: I mean, what went on? Do you remember about how you were reflecting on what you were and how you were trained, and all of a sudden you say, "Wow, I've got to really rethink my whole perspective on what I do?"

NJ: Yeah. It hasn't been real stable since. (Laughs)

SS: And you're on a wobbly chair right now. (Laughs)

NJ: Yes, it certainly did change the way I think. Also, the realization that 01:16:00there are a lot of concepts needed now to manage forests that I was not an expert on.

SS: So, how did you become conversant with the disciplines of the quote, "ologists" in all these other earth science areas, so you could merge what you were good at and trained in, and integrate that into more, shall we say, a progressive, post-modern forest planning and policy perspective?

NJ: Well, I'm not sure I entirely have, actually. But the Gang of Four report was a labor of love for all those who were involved.

SS: How long did it take you guys to write this thing?

NJ: Well, I wrote it.

SS: How long did it take you to write it?

NJ: We didn't have it when we presented it. It took me a few weeks.

SS: Okay.

NJ: But it was a labor of love. And so, I learned a lot because all these people were so forthcoming, especially, Thomas and Franklin and Sedell and Reeves. We knew we were on an adventure and knew things were changing. We knew that at last, they all could speak out on things that have been pretty squashed to that point. So, that was a very uplifting experience, and that made it easy to learn. It did. That was good stuff, and it was exhilarating and they were very kind to me. John Gordon was trained in physiology, and there were biologists, 01:18:00ecologists, and aquatic scientists. I was just this guy with this other stuff. We had a grand time.

SS: But isn't that what makes great collaborations, is that you complement each other and you're able to see the wisdom of other things, and then come together with something that isn't necessarily committed to any one person's perspective or one discipline or one person's interest?

NJ: Yes. And it was a lot different than FEMAT.

SS: Right. And so, we go from this to the Forest Summit. Did you watch it on television?

NJ: I listened to it when it was on radio. I didn't go. I spent the day with my dog out in the woods. I did listen, sure.

SS: And not too long after that, the charge was given for sixty days originally 01:19:00and I believe people begged for thirty more, and the whole FEMAT "pink tower" event, I jokingly call the "Slumber Party."

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Where people basically "camped out" and put together this gigantic document, or the information that came into this gigantic document. What do you remember about how that came together?

NJ: Well, Jack Ward Thomas knew before the summit he was going to be asked. And he got me together with him, and I really believe this is before the summit, to 01:20:00outline who would be involved, and who we would get. Some of the people from the owl study didn't want Franklin involved.

SS: Was there a particular reason?

NJ: Yeah, they thought he was too powerful of an individual.

SS: And Jerry is a presence, isn't he?

NJ: Yeah. And Jack and I actually spent a lot of time together working on who would be involved. Before it, the Gang of Four didn't know Jack well, but afterwards, he had a fair amount of trust in the end.

SS: He was a fairly strong personality, as well. I never met him, but know he was.

NJ: Yeah, he was. And Franklin and he, kind of at times, clashed. At any rate, I was sort of the grease between the two giant wheels. (Laughs) Okay. And so-

SS: Now, John [Gordon], was he involved in the FEMAT?

NJ: Not at all, he had broken his leg.

SS: Okay.

NJ: He was back, but he was not involved at all.

SS: Yeah, he told me he wasn't. He didn't tell me he broke his leg, though.

NJ: Yeah, he did break his leg, or Lyons would have had him out there. But we came to a crucial point. For the Gang of Four report, there were no managers involved. They were somewhat prohibited. It was just the staffers.

SS: I was told different things about both the FEMAT [meeting], but also the Gang of Four [meeting] at the [Memorial] Coliseum in Portland. For the record, both of them took place in Portland. The Gang of Four, shall we say, the planning symposium, took place in, shall we say, the exterior halls and rooms in 01:22:00Memorial Coliseum in Portland?

NJ: For one week. And then for four weeks in the OSU Center [Portland].

SS: Okay, so there was two separate events.

NJ: Because the week in the Coliseum, six days, were spent mapping.

SS: Okay. Basically, you were compiling all the known information in maps, and trying to come up with a collaborative median series of maps that took the best of all information and made the most complete?

NJ: Actually, mainly, we used the expert judgment and knowledge of all the different specialists from the national forests [in Northwest]. That was the first time they'd ever been asked to do that.

SS: Okay.

NJ: And then, we spent many weeks in the OSU Center, in which we were doing-

SS: That's here in Corvallis?

NJ: No, it's at Portland.

SS: Oh, the OSU Center, okay.

NJ: Sorry, I didn't make that clear. Not your fault.

SS: No, that's fine, okay.

NJ: Yeah, it's in Portland. And when we did this-we developed alternatives, because we had maps. We developed alternatives, did risk analysis, did harvest calculations. Now, I don't know where we were going with that.

SS: Well, the reason I brought it up is I wanted it for the sake of ---

NJ: Oh, now I know, yeah.

SS: -- For the sake of interesting anecdotes, really, how people that were managers or presences or political personalities, were not supposed to be in the meeting rooms where people were putting all the stuff together, and that they even had to wear like special badges and reflectors, almost like they were 01:24:00traffic cones walking through the room?

NJ: Yeah, they did that. We were trying to "break the cord" of the managers in controlling what the specialists said. By and large, it was successful, and sometimes it wasn't. And when we found out that still they would not identify any old-growth groves except those outside current timber sales.

SS: You knew they were under pressure from above.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: And they weren't being able to really "speak freely," in other words?

NJ: Well, not very well-known or known at all, is that I took possession of the maps, and they were in the basement of Peavy Hall. And I would let specialists in at night secretly to redraw them.

SS: Subterfuge. (Laughs)

NJ: And a couple forests, of which Siuslaw and Deschutes were two of them, we 01:25:00had to redraw them.

SS: What was wrong with them?

NJ: They wouldn't identify old growth that wasn't in existing timber sales.

SS: Right.

NJ: Or proposed.

SS: They were afraid of being reprimanded by their bosses, right?

NJ: Yeah, these were sales that hadn't been sold, but they were in planning.

SS: So, that would go along with what I've heard about, and they said it for the record, so I guess it safe for me to kind of encapsule the experience, is that when the Gang of Four, actually the committee hearings leading up to the report, that involved the Gang of Four, a couple of the people, specifically Gordon Reeves and Jim Sedell, but Gordie, I think, in particular, who was fairly young in this group at that time.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Was actually, kind of read the "riot act," by some people [USFS] above.

NJ: Yeah, yeah.

SS: And I guess that some Congressional people came to his aid because he was concerned because of what he said, because basically the fish and the water 01:26:00issues complicated the situation, to where, my God, I guess [Dale] Robertson and some of the top people got unhappy, shall we say? I'm putting a nice word on it, but they were not pleased.

NJ: No.

SS: Would that be fair? And that's a good example of what you're talking about, right?

NJ: Yeah, Thomas, and especially Reeves and Sedell, were in the Forest Service. They were subject to this dismay and sanction. Franklin and I were in the university and they couldn't do a damn thing to us. That is, from the Forest Service. Now, it's true that my dean sure heard about it from the industry. But my dean George Brown, protected me famously. He never even mentioned it once. There's one story you ought to know is that George-well, he never once came to me and yelled at me for the Gang of Four, and yet, he got yelled at a lot. He 01:27:00was a great dean.

SS: Continuing along that line.

NJ: But yeah, so there I was. And this was, I mean, what's going on here? I mean, things are totally out of control. The Forest Service had never experienced this before. BLM had never experienced it. Where basically, the keys to the kingdom were being handed over to a group of biologists, ecologists, scientists, and everybody else was pushed aside. And so, I was involved deeply with Jack in setting up the teams for FEMAT.

SS: That's right, we were on that, okay.

NJ: And the question was whether to have managers on the team.

SS: And the conclusion was?

NJ: I didn't know how that would work because they were so committed to their timber sale program.

SS: So, you were once again, the same dynamic you've been talking about for a while, just in that new forum?

NJ: Yeah, but that one was done behind the scenes, and they just didn't end up on the teams. And so that continued the freedom of thought. It also had the downside of complicating the realism of the plan, because they weren't heavily involved in crafting it, and also, complicating their commitment to it because they weren't involved in crafting it.

SS: So, okay, let's just go to the FEMAT process. Okay, the team is chosen. Jack and you are the head planning people, right?

NJ: Well, no. A lot of people were involved, but I was just at one stage in 01:29:00process. He [Thomas] came to me and we talked it through, and he talked to a lot of other people. I don't mean to say I was the only one involved. But it did get set up. Marty [Raphael] was to be head of the ecological and biological, and I was going to be head of the economic and social.

SS: Marty Raphael, correct?

NJ: Yeah, but the PNW Station people really complained about that. I had to calculate harvest levels, because that's where things turned, in terms of the interest by the Clinton administration. They wanted to take care of all the species, but they had commitments to the other entities. I really focused on the 01:30:00harvest levels, working with the Forest Service and the BLM. There were representatives of both, we had a team, and we worked on harvest levels. I could talk to you more about that later.

SS: They chose a place, the "Pink Tower."

NJ: Yep, the 32nd Floor.

SS: What's that?

NJ: 32nd Floor.

SS: 32nd Floor of the Bank of America building? Or no, it's the - ?

NJ: U.S. Bank.

SS: U.S. Bank building in downtown Portland. And everybody's basically called in. How many people, 175 total that were involved?

NJ: Oh, I think there were a couple hundred involved. But some only came when needed. There was a core team that was there all the time. But then, when they called in people for risk assessment and review, there were other people that joined up for short periods. Yeah, absolutely.

SS: So what happened then, on day one? You were given a sixty-day window that fortunately got stretched to ninety days, because you just couldn't get it done?

NJ: Well, no, no. No, no. We got it done. The Clinton administration didn't like the answer.

SS: Oh, so they asked for more alternatives?

NJ: They asked for something better. And they were given the-[report]-we reported to them in the Indian Treaty Room back in the old executive office building that is on the White House grounds. This is jumping ahead, I'll just say this.

SS: That's fine.

NJ: That again, to achieve something with no L's [low ratings] in it, the level of protection they were after, they didn't get the harvest levels they wanted, and there was kind of a magic [number] of about a billion board-feet. And so, Franklin, and some others, Sedell, and maybe me, thought there could be more 01:32:00integrated alternatives. So, we presented the alternatives, and there was a lot of pushing and shoving. FEMAT was not the friendly environment of the Gang of Four. It was really pretty contentious among all the scientists.

SS: So, going back to day one. I kind of leaped ahead and you were responding to my concluding comment in that question. You're given sixty days. What happened on day one, and how did you guys pull it together as people started coming in? Characterize the atmosphere of how the place was divided up, how the teams worked together or didn't work together, collaborated, fought, etc. Just tell me that story as best you remember. You had your specialty, but were involved in the whole thing.

NJ: Yeah. The teams didn't work much together. The social scientists didn't work 01:33:00much with the economists. The aquatic people didn't work much with the wildlife people. As Jack used to say, it just kind of all clicked together at the end. So, it very much it was tribal, very tribal. And there was the people that had put together the owl plan. I don't know if you have it here, the ISC report? [1990]

SS: I've got one of the owl plans here. I've just got the '88 one, I believe, just for the sake of discussion.

NJ: No, the ISC, you know, there's-

SS: I've got this one. I just bring this one along for a prop.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: This was the '85 one, actually, an early one.

NJ: Let me just tell you as an aside. The ISC report really ushered in this monumental change, and it's a wonderful piece of work.

SS: Yeah, I've got it on a pdf. NJ: It's really wonderful. It really is a 01:34:00wonderful piece of work. But the folks that put that together were pretty defensive about that's what we ought to have as the plan. And thus-

SS: Like a plan, a singular plan?

NJ: Well, just that that's the one we really want here.

SS: How would that have allowed for more or less timber harvest, for instance?

NJ: Well, it's kind of funny here. It was as much a planning philosophy, and it's a little hard for me to explain when I'm really thinking about it, and who was in charge. There were battles over who's in charge, and whose way of thinking about things, was in charge.

SS: Are we going with FEMAT now?

NJ: FEMAT.

SS: Okay, got you.

NJ: Is it the wildlife biologist? Is it the landscape ecologist? Do the social 01:35:00people have any say in how we shape things? Who is to shape the alternatives? How do you shape them? Those were the real arguments at the beginning.

SS: What's the role of the aquatic?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: How big are the buffers going to be? How are they going to relate to the-

NJ: Well, it wasn't there yet. It was whose way of thinking about things. And the landscape ecologists think differently than the spotted owl folks. We tend to emphasize structure, and the aquatic people emphasize process. The social scientists have a whole different approach than the economists. There was a real battle about who was in charge, and that went all the way through the thing. We didn't have that battle with the Gang of Four.

SS: How was that reflected in the final report here in terms of FEMAT, and from what you say, the lack of unanimity and agreement on certain things?

NJ: Well-

SS: It's hard to get that from reading this master document unless you were 01:36:00involved and you did the whole thing. That's why I'm asking you?

NJ: Yeah. As an example, the landscape ecologists wanted what they called an ecosystem plan, and so did Jack. And the wildlife biologists, many of them wanted a very specific plan for each species, and that's how we ended up with "Survey and Manage." [Implementation policy added to NWFP after FEMAT was accepted] They didn't agree.

SS: So, the "coarse-filter" versus the "fine-filter" approach?

NJ: Yeah, exactly.

SS: Exactly.

NJ: It was like a five-sided star, or five-sided boxing ring. And the social 01:37:00scientists and economists had different views, too, like what parts of the landscape are in trouble economically, and which aren't. So, a lot of this was not well-integrated. We were trying to hold onto things by our fingertips to understand what everybody was saying so we could model it. By the way, there is another report on timber harvest scheduling you don't have. That was the report on the timber side of it that actually didn't get into FEMAT because it couldn't be done until they'd finished their model.

SS: Is that one that you wrote?

NJ: Yes. We couldn't develop harvest numbers until we got the alternatives and what they meant, which meant, we had to sort of have that.

SS: In other words, the maps and reserves, and how they all interlocked together?

NJ: Not only that, but what are the prescriptions you can have and what can't you have.

SS: Yeah, what can happen on a later successional, what could happen on a Matrix, what could happen on AMA's, etc.?

NJ: Yes, yes.

SS: And how they interlocked and also you have the relationship of Forest 01:38:00Service lands with BLM lands. And then we're not even talking about Oregon and Washington forest lands [state-owned].

NJ: Yeah.

SS: By the way, I forgot to ask you earlier. How would you characterize the difference between cultures in Oregon and Washington vis-à-vis forested lands, timber resources, from the state perspective, mainly?

NJ: From the perspective of people in state government, do you mean?

SS: Yes, or even the cultures of the states. I mean, Jerry has very strong opinions about the difference between Oregon and Washington, and I just wonder what your view on that whole thing was?

NJ: Well, I doubt Franklin and I agree on that, but we've never talked about it. Oregon doesn't have that much really high elevation forests like the North 01:39:00Cascades. It's not near as amenable to classic definitions of a national park or wilderness. So, they're different, geologically and geographically. But within that context, it's true that timber has had a larger role in shaping state politics on the national forests, in Oregon.

SS: In Oregon, okay.

NJ: Timber companies, like Weyerhaeuser, have had a major effect on shaping policy in Washington. Here [Oregon], we don't have a dominant state or private owner. So, there have been a lot of differences, and what's throwing me here is 01:40:00much of this perspective didn't come from state government. State government's been largely insignificant and uninvolved in federal forest policy. It's been our delegation. [Congress]

SS: Right.

NJ: That was very powerful and positioned and focused on timber. So, it really is the difference in the congressional delegations, I think more than state government.

SS: Now, I was just trying to relate to what I remember Jerry talking about.

NJ: Yeah, so I think that our politicians in Congress, when it was a regional issue, they were in the lead. It was partly their positions of seniority. I'm not sure the politicians in Washington would have done it differently, but they weren't in the positions of power during this time.

SS: How would you characterize the congressional delegations, and I haven't talked about this yet, of Oregon and Washington, leading up to and during the Northwest Forest Plan process? Maybe singling out one or two people that took 01:41:00leading roles in pulling or pushing it through?

NJ: Well, they stood back. They didn't push it through. None of them. I mean, they stood back. Once they got the Gang of Four report and they saw there was no really easy solution, they said, "We're staying out of it," and turned it over to the Clinton administration.

SS: In other words, they didn't see a "win-win" for them politically?

NJ: Correct. That's what really came out of the Gang of Four. So, they stood back, and as an example, for the only time in history, all nineteen members of both congressional delegations, and including the governors of Oregon and Washington, signed a joint-letter asking for a seminar on all of this, by us and some others. So, they were unified in the value of the scientific involvement, 01:42:00pretty much. They were unified in knowing they needed a solution, and they were also unified in saying, "We're not passing legislation. It's got to be administrative, because we can't find enough of a sweet spot to do anything." So, they stood out of the way.

SS: So, this letter you talked about, was that after this, but before FEMAT?

NJ: This letter?

SS: No, no, not that letter, but the letter you're talking about, the nineteen signatories?

NJ: Oh, that was before. That was after the Gang of Four, before FEMAT.

SS: Okay, got you.

NJ: That was their, "Okay, educate us more." We met up at the Red Lion in Vancouver [Washington] with the staffers. So, they still wanted to know about it, but they just stepped back. They did not in any way harass us, though. There 01:43:00was a representative, one from Washington, near the Olympics, and he was pretty powerful in the Corporation Committee. He called me before FEMAT, and his name was Norm, too. I said, "Hey man, this is a bitter pill to swallow, but this is as good as it gets." He said, "Okay." He didn't see broad condemnation of FEMAT. However, there was a hearing on it in D.C. with three congressional committees. If you want, I can talk to you about this now or later?

SS: Oh, go ahead. I'm listening. This is great.

NJ: Regarding the delegations, we leader had to go talk, and Brian Greber, from 01:44:00OSU, did the economic analysis. And we went to the hearing, and now, they're in prime time. They knew very well that this is going to have enormous employment impacts. And Bob Smith and Congressman DeFazio really got after the employment analysis, and Brian Greber on the fly, couldn't really satisfy their requests for information.

SS: You're talking about FEMAT and employment? Yeah, okay.

NJ: Yes.

SS: The economic/social part of it?

NJ: Finally, he calculated some enormous number of jobs you might say were being lost, and they got really angry. Congressman DeFazio got all these other people 01:45:00to defer to him, and he was really on a tear. And he actually took the report and said, "We asked for a credible analysis and you gave us an incredible analysis," and threw the FEMAT report over his shoulder.

SS: So, he threw it like against the wall or -- ?

NJ: Oh, just behind him like this [over the shoulder gesture].

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: They were in tears. I don't know. So, there was this coming out, that people were upset about the job loss from our delegation, but that was when the spotlight was on them. We were just left alone.

SS: It was a political show just a little bit?

NJ: Yes, totally. But it was honest and genuine, and so was he [DeFazio]. But when we were doing FEMAT, there wasn't a lot of political interference. That's what I'm getting at. We didn't hear from them.

SS: Well, I think that's what makes this a rather remarkable process is how two 01:46:00parts of the whole process, the Gang of Four and FEMAT, took place in, I don't want to call it a vacuum, but a relative vacuum in terms of how these things usually happen where you had meddlers from all sides, and of course, in the post-NEPA era, the public.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: You know, the environmentalists, "Joe Blow," everybody was giving their input, and you guys were basically in these little bubbles, temporarily.

NJ: That's right.

SS: That's very unique in the post-NEPA era, anyway.

NJ: Yeah, it is. In fact, I just want to come back to that, because it was. We were in what you'd call this bubble. We were sequestered. And none of the political leaders bothered us then, but when we surfaced again and Congressman DeFazio could register his dismay and outrage, he certainly did. But it was his district that was going to lose most of this employment. It was devastating. So, 01:47:00I'm not surprised he got upset. And boy, if you couldn't respond to his questions quickly, he got madder and madder. But it was in this public setting after things were pretty well set, so it wasn't going to change much. As you may have learned, FEMAT was successfully litigated by the industry over a FACA violation.

SS: Which federal act is FACA?

NJ: Federal Advisory Committee Act.

SS: Which basically means the lack of the involvement, the cloistered-fact aspect, was basically attacked. And then partly, because they were non-federal employees? [Some of team were not]

NJ: Yes, because I was involved, as well as Franklin and others.

SS: That's what I meant.

NJ: Yeah, it turned out the judge said, yes, the way this was developed was illegal. However, he didn't see how opening it up would have changed things now.

SS: So, this stood?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: Yeah, I remember hearing about the challenge.

NJ: Right.

SS: Now, looking at the broader sweep of economics and timber, and forestry and logging and timber harvest in the Northwest, there are many other factors involved with how things played out over the '60s, '70s, '80s and '90s. How would you characterize those other factors, whether it be foreign markets, technology, etc., in terms of what would lead to the drop-off in timber harvest in comparison to what this document and the Record of Decision [guidelines for implementing NWFP] and all the guidelines would play out in terms of limiting harvest on federal lands after the implementation of a plan? You understand what 01:49:00I'm saying?

NJ: Sure.

SS: The broad sweep of things. Your interpretation is the comparative weighting of factors versus perception. NJ: Well, a couple of things happened. Certainly you can see it, and I showed my students, that in '82 there was a recession caused by high interest rates. Then, when timber harvests came back in the mid to late-'80s, the employment didn't come back near as much. The industry used that time, really, there was a wind roaring at the industry's back, a shift to automation and all sorts of things. So there already was a significant reduction of employment before we -

SS: Before the injunction and any of that stuff ever happened.

NJ: Absolutely. Secondly, and I'd have to look in detail, but the export market picked up in Japan, and a lot of private timber was going to export. So, there 01:50:00was a reduction in raw material here before this hit in terms of what the mills can have available. There were other forces at work, no doubt, that would have reduced the employment. And another thing that came out of FEMAT was the acknowledgement that the regional economy here wasn't near as dependent on timber as it used to be. That came out of the analysis. Now, it's true that within the range of the northern spotted owl, which was the focus of the analysis, you have Seattle and Portland, and all these other areas, so there, it's the classic urban/rural divide. But when you look at it all, the regional economy has got to keep going even if the federal timber harvest changed dramatically. Once that was realized by the political leadership, I think it 01:51:00changed, it altered, how much energy they were going to put into rehashing this.

SS: You're talking about after the [Northwest] Forest Plan was implemented?

NJ: When it was being developed. The notion about let's repeal the ESA, or all this, no. That would take enormous effort. Things were changing anyway, and this was one of the factors. But the regional economy was still growing. And that's a big deal.

SS: Right.

NJ: It changes it from a regional economic problem to a local community economic problem, and not just based on timber.

SS: In other words, communities out there where the smaller mills are, let's say, withered away. Part of the reason was, well, there was a lot of different factors. But do you understand why a lot of these communities point to certain factors that may or may not be correct, but they see the "ologists" and the 01:52:00environmentalists, and all these people, as basically laying the hammer down on their way of life?

NJ: Well, yeah, yes! I'd be right there with them if I was in their community, so, yeah. On the other hand, this [NWFP, social changes] did contribute. But there were a lot of other forces at work.

SS: That was my point that I was trying to get to.

NJ: Yeah, there definitely is. And we have it on the charts I show in my class. I just talked to students about this two weeks ago. You can really see it. Also, FEMAT did really emphasize this is just part of the timber supply base. There are private lands. And that this is just a piece of the puzzle.

SS: How do you feel that BLM vs. Forest Service issues were addressed adequately 01:53:00in this plan, and just during the whole process?

NJ: There were no BLM issues that were recognized.

SS: No, I mean how did the BLM-Forest Service collaborate?

NJ: Well, I think I'm trying to say something else.

SS: That's what I meant to say. Okay, go ahead.

NJ: What I'm trying to say is, BLM has a different organic act. BLM is also not under the viability clause [to National Forest Management Act, which affects Forest Service only]. They were treated just like the Forest Service. We're still trying to figure out what that means as of today, because they're not quite like the Forest Service, and they have a commitment to communities, and their economic development the Forest Service doesn't have in its organic act.

SS: Alright.

NJ: So, they were treated as the same.

SS: Even though they're not the same?

NJ: Yeah, so that's the first thing.

SS: So, that provides political and legal and cultural oddities, shall we say?

NJ: Yeah, and we're about to hit it again with the Trump administration. We're 01:54:00about to hit it again.

SS: I'd like to close with that later near the end, but I want to ask you about that because there's a lot of concern out in the Forest Service, amongst science people, and a lot of people, about what's coming down the pike.

NJ: Yeah, but in terms of how they collaborated, I think that if we talk about the scientists involved, I think they worked well. I don't think there were these "tribes" based on specialty, and it wasn't really confounded much by Forest Service or BLM. The ISC had set the model where they worked together fine. That really wasn't a big deal; the Forest Service and BLM scientists being separate, or thinking about things differently, or anything.

SS: But don't you think that this whole process, though, was positive in the 01:55:00sense that two agencies that can be at loggerheads, were actually forced to sit down in the same room over extended periods of time, planning and writing, hashing out, and it put a different face on that relationship.

NJ: But the agencies didn't sit down and write anything.

SS: No, but I'm just saying the people did, though.

NJ: But that's different. And they weren't the managers.

SS: Okay. So, you think that the stove-piping never really changed much in terms of things at the top, though?

NJ: I'm not saying that. I'm just trying to be accurate in what happened.

SS: No, I know that. I'm just trying to get us to frame this a little bit, and see the different aspects of it.

NJ: I think there was much more of a cooperative spirit afterwards for a while.

SS: That's what I've heard, but it didn't last forever.

NJ: No, it didn't. But for a while, it did. It was unprecedented and did engage the agencies in an ecosystem plan across boundaries. It was great. They caught 01:56:00that, yeah. And for a while it was wonderful. But that's not the natural order. (Laughs) That takes continued energy.

SS: Right, I know. I mean, "turf" will return to "turf."

NJ: Yeah, there you go, there you go.

SS: It's like the Beavers and the Ducks. [Oregon sports rivalry] [Break in audio.] Anyway, we took a little break for a minute, and we're going to return to where we were with the FEMAT process. And Norm's just going to continue talking here, and we'll pick it up from there.

NJ: Just a couple of things about this. In terms of FEMAT, it was very tribal. Occasionally, the "tribes" would come together, talk to each other, then go back and work. It was done multi-disciplinary as they say, not so much 01:57:00interdisciplinary. The crucial time came when we put together an update, as the Clinton administration wanted one on where we were. This is about six weeks into our supposed two-month period, maybe seven weeks.

SS: So, you were close to the sixty-day deadline.

NJ: We went back to D.C. with alternatives we had developed, somewhat like the Gang of Four alternatives, but a little more sophisticated, as they had different kinds of reserve systems, differences in the extent and kinds of activities permitted within them, and different prescriptions for the "Matrix." [Zoning category in NWFP] We ended up with eight or nine alternatives that had different themes and characteristics, and for which we'd estimated the harvest levels. The billion board feet was somewhat of a magic number. We wanted to 01:58:00protect the species and have harvest level over a billion. The protection level the biologists hung on, was this eighty percent likelihood of habitat for viable populations for the next hundred years, except for fish, where you couldn't likely achieve because of intermixed ownerships [waterways]. At any rate, so we tried to do this. Some of the alternatives didn't meet the viability thresholds, others did. But we went back to D.C., a set of maybe six of us, and met in the Indian Treaty Room in the old executive office building with a number of Clinton staffers. The President wasn't there, the Vice President wasn't there, the 01:59:00Secretary of Interior wasn't there. It was really their staffers there.

SS: Was Ag there? It would have been just the staffers, right?

NJ: Yeah, it would be the staffers who were there.

SS: Because Babbitt [Bruce] and Espy [Mike] were the Interior and Ag secretaries at that time?

NJ: Right.

SS: Yeah.

NJ: That's good. So anyway, let me go on. We presented these to Secretary Babbitt's staff, and they talked for hours. We went through this in great detail, much more detail than I think we should have, and especially on the biological side, for them. And also, they gave us no food at all. I don't know who was thinking about what we needed there.

SS: It's because it's dinner time now for us, too.

NJ: Yeah. And Secretary Babbitt had an associate or his undersecretary, who was 02:00:00very tight with the Carpenter's Union, come into the room, I'll never forget, jiggling his change. He was standing in the back, and all he asked is, "what's the harvest level?" That's all he wanted to know. He heard some numbers and he laughed. Basically, they were dissatisfied with the harvest that would be associated with the levels of species protection they thought were needed.

SS: So, the tradeoff was too much for what they initially heard?

NJ: Yeah. And at the same time, even before we'd gotten there, and there was a sense that we had done this all independently. Perhaps if we integrated it, we could find some efficiencies. It really was a look for efficiencies. And the 02:01:00efficiencies were really related to where the key watersheds and the late successional reserves were located, and if we could overlap them more and things like that. We reached an agreement with them that we'd go back and craft one more that had characteristics they'd like, they did like some things more than others, and yet, might achieve a harvest level of over a billion board-feet. And that meant a one-month extension [sixty- day deadline becomes ninety]. We did that, and we went back to work.

And that's where something unusual happened. Members of the different groups, key members, Franklin, Sedell, Forsman, and myself, we went literally behind a 02:02:00curtain and started. There was a curtain. And back there, we got pens and we started redrawing the alternatives to try to incorporate the different ideas we'd gotten from D.C. and elsewhere while still achieving a board-feet harvest level that was a little higher, really over a billion, and yet, still would have the protections. And so, that went on. And with drawing, changing the boundaries of the reserves, that certainly was very collaborative. But the people that were involved in that one were all friends and had been involved with this at least from the Gang of Four.

SS: So, it was collegial?

NJ: Oh, yeah.

SS: By definition. Yeah.

NJ: I give Eric Forsman all the credit in the world because if he hadn't been willing to participate, we didn't really have somebody from the owl side. He really helped. We crafted something and quickly estimated the numbers, and the numbers turned out okay, 1.1 billion. What happened all the way through this, is when we'd calculate the numbers, we did get responses from operations people, who would ask, is this feasible? We'd work them through and make deductions if it wasn't feasible. Then what happened, for a couple of evenings, Franklin's idea, before the forest supervisors came in to look at them, we would talk about the alternatives.

SS: And this was in Portland?

NJ: Yeah, it was in Portland.

SS: So, that was against the spirit of the original idea to keep the managers out, correct?

NJ: Yeah, yes. Well, it (laughs), it wasn't so much that we wanted to keep them out, as that we had to break through this commitment to their existing proposed sale program. But, we still desperately wanted to know what they thought of it all, and where the flaws were.

SS: What is your recollection of what they thought of it?

NJ: Well, they were stunned.

SS: Good stunned, or bad?

NJ: No, they were just stunned.

SS: Okay.

NJ: And not quite sure what the hell all this was, because it was so unprecedented. Is this really going to happen, and when do we get our shot? And so, they did come in, and Jerry walked them through it. I thought it was very brave for Jerry, very courageous for him. He did walk them through it. And by 02:05:00that, I mean Alternative 9. And so, we didn't go back to D.C., but Jack may have gone, I'm not sure about that. However, the President did pick it [9] as his alternative [NWFP]. That last crucial stage was where we started trying to meld things together, and Jack was very magnanimous because it was as much identified with Franklin as anyone, but it happened. And yeah, done with felt-tipped pens. That's how the LSR's came to be, the boundaries. [Late Successional Reserves]

SS: Now, what was your feeling at the time, about the zoning scheme, criticisms 02:06:00and compliments, and versus now, how you see it [NWFP] actually working out in real time and space? Especially when the new guidelines and rules were added, and Jerry told me a lot about that, "survey and manage" and stuff like that.

NJ: Well, first off, in terms of the fundamental design, I am happy to say that what I am going to say to you now, is confirmed by a headline in the Oregonian from 1994 or '93. Okay, now we have Option 9 [Actually "Alternative 9"] done, and it's over, just about over. We haven't done a harvest report, because we've been calculating the harvest levels.

SS: Within that zoning plan?

NJ: The latest one, yeah. We never got a harvest report into the FEMAT report. That's the one part that's missing. In that report, we pointed out that in the 02:07:00"Matrix," for the first 30 years, the harvest was still supposed to come from the mature and old growth, and we didn't see how that would happen. We didn't see how it happened in 1993, and we put it in our report. The Oregonian, I don't know who gave it to them, I just turned the report in to the group then working on the NEPA document, and I didn't give it to anybody. Then, it got leaked to the Oregonian, and they published the headline above the fold, "Clinton Plan Doubly-Flawed, New Report Says." I'd got ahold of that, and it was because they were still cutting old-growth, as without you wouldn't have a sustainable predictable harvest. We said it then. Because what happened, the zoning was 02:08:00done, and with the distributed cutting of the past, there was a lot of old-growth and mature forest not in the Matrix, not as much in the reserves [Late- Successional]. It was still there; it was still going to be the basis of the harvest. So, in that part, which is a key part of this, we thought even before the addition of "survey and manage," which really crunched the attempt to harvest the mature and old.

SS: Adding another ESA element to it, right?

NJ: Well, not ESA. [Endangered Species Act]

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: No, that's real important, because that's the rub. The rub is, that I want to finish this thought, and I'm going to come back to it, okay?

SS: Yeah. Go, go, go, just keep going.

NJ: The thing is that it was real improbable those harvest levels are going to be met. We put it in our report. All the people doing the harvest calculations. The Oregonian picked it up. Yeah, so from the beginning, we thought the plan was 02:09:00in some trouble.

SS: Because you didn't think that it would meet, especially, the economic projections that were-

NJ: The harvest levels, because it's dependent on the mature and old forests.

SS: But there were basically two rows of the projections? NJ: Yes, the projections were accurate, if those stands had been cut. We were skeptical that they would ever be harvested.

SS: And that's because of?

NJ: They were still cutting old-growth, which is a major public controversy.

SS: Yeah, so you just figured that it didn't matter that this great plan had come out, just the mere fact that it was continuing even within the context of this multi-faceted plan, that was still going to be met by-

NJ: Protest and --

SS: Protests and controversy, and it was correct.

NJ: Yeah. But the Survey and Manage, which Jerry talked about and was added later. What happened is the notion that these are the living things within the mature and old forests, of which there may be 800 species, most of them 02:10:00invertebrates. We don't know much about them. You take 400 and say, if we find them, we'll buffer them or figure this out. That was Survey and Manage. We said, if you're going to reserve eighty percent of remaining old growth, none of these species are known to be threatened. You could assume this new set of reserves will protect them until proven otherwise, or you can assume that we don't know. Whenever we find one ["endangered" or "threatened" species], we've got to protect it. Franklin and Thomas and myself were in the former camp, but folks, after we left, convinced the Clinton administration to add "Survey and Manage."

SS: By the people that wrote the guidelines for implementation?

NJ: However, the thing is that there were difficulties before because of this 02:11:00dependence on old growth and mature forests. We wrote that. The fact that it came true didn't surprise me. I wrote that and turned in the report. I didn't make a big deal about it, but the Oregonian did before the ink was even dry. So that was a pretty big deal.

SS: No.

NJ: In retrospect, we made the mistake of continuing the same kind of division people have done forever, which is dividing the area into reserves and matrix areas, and that doesn't work well anymore. In the Thomas, et al. Conservation 02:12:00Biology 2006 or '07 report, we pointed that out.

SS: The real well-known article, right?

NJ: Yeah. SS: Basically, they did it looking at the ten-year review numbers. Correct?

NJ: So, nowadays, the biggest change in our, my thinking, certainly you can't divide up the world into reserves and timber production areas, it doesn't work anymore on federal lands. It just doesn't.

SS: So, you think that the zoning, however great it sounded and looked, that it just was intrinsically-flawed?

NJ: Yes.

SS: Elaborate a little more on that.

NJ: Intrinsically flawed in that the "reserves" needed a lot of harvest in the 02:13:00plantations, and to contribute a fair amount of harvest as of this day, but we never counted it. And the "Matrix," federal lands just doesn't have timber production areas anymore. There's so many considerations on every acre, you just don't have those areas that we imagine where you just can schedule an allowable cut and be sure of it.

SS: Somebody is going to be out there saying, I don't want this to happen.

NJ: Yeah, or the biologists will come and say, no, we've got this or that. So, that approach is not fruitful on the national forests. I don't think it's fruitful much on BLM, either. So, that's a change in my thinking, that really is, and the fact that economic considerations were sufficient to justify 02:14:00harvests. Unless you provide an ecological benefit, you're not going to have a stable timber harvest program. So, those are changes.

SS: Why do you think the AMA's failed, the Adaptive Management Areas? There were one or two [Applegate, Central Cascades] that had some activity, but most of them just didn't. The whole idea of the "laboratory" for new innovative methods and practices on these areas, didn't seem to go anywhere from what I've been told, except for a couple of successes.

NJ: Well, it's because of problems on both sides of the equation. I mean, [George] Stankey was right in his article, that when you've got threatened species, it's difficult to take risks, so folks protecting the threatened or listed species, were reluctant for innovation. That's really true. On the other 02:15:00side, I was part of the problem. I'm sitting there one night in FEMAT, in Jack's office. Somebody from the White House called and said, "What the hell are these AMAs"? Nobody knows this story. You're the first to hear it, okay? So, he [the voice from White House] says, "What in the hell," I think it was Lyons [who called]. "What in the hell are these AMA's? We can't take any further reduction in timber harvest. What are you doing with these AMA's?" They were largely Franklin's creation. [Tom Spies also pushed the concept hard.]

SS: It was basically a way to have a laboratory for his new forestry concepts, would that be fair enough to say?

NJ: That's a pretty good insight. Because when we were thinking about them, they would be trying out things, but would have some latitude in how much timber was 02:16:00appraised. Basically, the people with the threatened species and protecting them, said, "Don't try this in the LSR's." In the Matrix, that's the timber production land. They said, "What are you doing with this, you're just going to try out things? The harvest level's already too low, and now you're going to sort of cut loose some land to try out things?" So, I said to him, "Well, you could reign that in some. You could say that it's an innovative way to reach the harvest level."

SS: Glass is half-full, in other words.

NJ: Yeah. And actually constrain it to meet the harvest level, but that they can also try other things, which is the way it turned out. And so that greatly constrained what they could do. And then the fact that some was mature and old, 02:17:00where they were already existing, like in Applegate [southern Oregon], they did find innovative ways to achieve the harvest level.

SS: Down south, right?

NJ: And in a couple other places they did some experiments, but soon, they were treated just like the rest of the Matrix, because that's what they were. They never got the release from both sides to do something.

SS: I was also told that for the AMA's, it depended a lot on the local supervisors and the staff [initiative, ideas, funding, resources].

NJ: Oh, totally.

SS: And whether they had people that were energized. Like for instance, since I've been involved with the Andrews Forest, and Fred Swanson and all those people, they had a particularly active core.

NJ: Yeah, they already had the institutional framework.

SS: Yeah, they were right there ready to do the experimentation.

NJ: Exactly, so Applegate had -

SS: That was an exception. NJ: Applegate had the institutional framework already. They had an institutional framework [and engaged constituencies]. There was some good stuff done in Goosenest, because it was near to the Redding office. Again, an institutional framework. You didn't have that in most AMAs. You didn't create it. The agencies didn't realize that the agencies and their supervisors didn't have the wherewithal or the background, to create institutions as experiment stations. They just saw it as Matrix.

SS: So, they basically saw AMAs is an extension of the Matrix?

NJ: Oh, yeah.

SS: They just thought potential timber land versus laboratory land or whatever?

NJ: Exactly, because they still had the timber target.

SS: Which they weren't meeting?

NJ: Which they were going to have trouble with, yes.

SS: Yes.

NJ: What happened is that Applegate did a lot of this, H.J. Andrews [Central Cascades AMA] just did a little. They have pretty much stopped harvest on much 02:19:00of the AMA. They had difficulties, so they did a little. But Applegate found really innovative ways. They also had a collaborative group and a lot of public support, which the H.J. Andrews didn't have. The Andrews floundered on the relationship with the collaborative groups. I loved the work, don't get me wrong, but it's hard to find anyone that supports the AMA idea in the region.

SS: Because they saw how it didn't work, and they understood why?

NJ: I don't know the reasoning, but that's one that's still innovative. But the 02:20:00basic zoning, those three zones, the LSR's, the Matrix and AMA's, didn't create the distinctions that were hoped for. The Aquatic Conservation Strategy was a tremendously innovative development under FEMAT. It's really something and it's evolved. It was a major contribution to thinking. We had this riparian buffer in 02:21:00the zoning. Basically, the zoning, all parts of it, are imperfect, and the national forests are being managed without the distinctions between the different zones that were envisioned, especially those three. The only one that 02:22:00gets close is the Aquatic Conservation Strategy, and even that, because of an inability to innovate, is very limited.

SS: But do you think that the Aquatic Conservation Strategy would be categorized as perhaps the plan's biggest success?

NJ: I think it was the biggest intellectual innovation. I think the plan was successful despite what I just said about the zones. I think the plan was successful in fundamentally changing our thinking about national forests and their function, and how we look at that. And so, I think it was really an important document to shift perceptions and foundations.

SS: I've got a question directly on that. I don't read all my questions because you were going along and answering a lot of them. But this one, I want to ask specifically right now. In natural resource planning history, how would you describe the Northwest Forest Plan, maybe in terms of if you were teaching a class, let's even say, in terms of process and policy content, and can it be considered a model or a one-time thing?

NJ: Read that again, please.

SS: Okay, in natural resource planning history, how would you describe the Northwest Forest Plan in terms of process and policy content, and can it be considered a model or a one-time thing?

NJ: In the process used, sequestering a bunch of scientists in a tower and 02:24:00giving them the keys to the kingdom, I think it's a one-time thing. I think it only occurs in time of crisis.

SS: And that was a time of crisis.

NJ: When existing institutions cannot cope. So, you have to have a crisis, you have the have the failure of existing institutions to cope. But in terms of the notion that you need to deeply engage the scientific community supported by, but unfettered by management, to create planning frameworks, where the scientists take what they've learned and turn it into a framework for planning, that enabled the protection of species and ecosystems, it was a major model. Even though I would do it differently, still, the notion that you need scientific 02:25:00involvement to move beyond summarizing the results to suggest a planning framework, how you implement ideas for understanding of aquatics, the ideas for understanding spotted owls, that was a really important contribution, and really needs to be part of the institutional framework for planning on federal lands.

SS: Have you seen aspects or large components of this transferred elsewhere in the United States in federal land planning and policy implementation? There hasn't been one event this celebrated, this high level, but I know elements of it have been used in transfer to tribes [Indian]. Right?

NJ: Yeah. Many of them are species-specific like the lynx, in which they need to 02:26:00engage the scientific community in moving beyond explaining how you turn it into management. I think that, in SNEP, we've tried to do that. That is, the Sierra Nevada [Ecosystem Project]. And in that little book you've got, the gray book-

SS: The bio-regional assessment book?

NJ: Yeah. That book has examples, okay. But I've got to tell you that now, at least in this region, people are moving the other direction, in which the scientists are being told, "don't do that." You see that in the science assessment that's going on now led by the PNW Station.

SS: The twenty-year assessment?

NJ: No, the one about the science findings framework.

SS: Oh, basically, they're assessing science, per se, as a tool. Right?

NJ: Yeah, and supposedly providing a framework for planning, but it's not being done, because the scientists aren't taking that next step. They're really staying way back inside their discipline, summarizing the results, near as I can tell. I think that's a real problem. I'm worried. We'll see how it all turns out. But the lesson of FEMAT is if you want scientifically-credible strategies, scientists have to help create them. You just can't turn them over to management.

SS: Now, who are the people that put in some of the rules that Jerry, for instance, said, and I know Jack, didn't like either?

NJ: But I just want to come back to this for a minute, okay?

SS: Okay, no problem.

NJ: Thomas changed everything with ISC when he said, "scientifically credible" strategy for the northern spotted owl. If you want scientists involved in this, you want scientifically-credible strategies. The scientists have to move out of 02:28:00just summarizing results to helping create them, or they won't be credible. That's the lesson of ISC, Gang of Four, FEMAT, for all of them.

SS: You have to put in detail and prescriptions, and not just -- ?

NJ: You have to say what sort of planning frameworks fit the underlying science of the way these things work. You have to find a way to do that. It doesn't necessarily mean the scientists have to do it all, but they have to be engaged. And we have not figured out how to do that in this region.

SS: But so, you think though that some of the prescriptions that were problematic after FEMAT and its implementation.

NJ: Right. I'm saying that FEMAT and this whole process, showed that, given the 02:29:00issues faced by federal lands, and given our modern society and understanding, and their expectations, until the recent election perhaps, of our reliance on science, that you can't separate science from management. You can't just say, "Scientists, summarize the results. We'll figure out how to use it." That doesn't work. That's the major lesson of all of this. And so, it did provide a new, if you want to use it, a new intellectual and institutional approach to 02:30:00planning and policy on the federal lands.

SS: Perhaps closer to what Jerry calls "wild science"? Institutionally-directed science was what before ruled the roost, and it was tied to previous goals and paradigms and philosophical foundations, and the "wild science" being science, basic science for science's sake, had a role of coming in, this is what we see independent of what the institution previously viewed as science and its role within that institution's mission and mandate?

NJ: I actually think I'm saying something different, but I know.

SS: Okay, I'm just saying what might have said-

NJ: I'm not talking about whether it's directed science or original science, but I am saying that you need scientists to help translate it into planning frameworks. I'll give you the number one example. Before the ISC, the Forest 02:31:00Service was focused on little "free owl clusters" around the region as the owl protective framework.

SS: Which is essentially what this 1985 report was about, correct?

NJ: Exactly. The owl scientists, it took them a long time to finally come up with the idea, based on owl biological data, that you need self-sustaining areas of owl populations close enough together so they could disperse. And then they actually illustrated one of them. There could be others, or there are others. That's what I mean by turning science into a planning framework with a matrix in-between. That's what I meant by that. While it needs to be more ecumenical than in the past, I am gravely concerned that scientists are now being told to 02:32:00stay in their caves, just summarize the results and they'll figure out how to turn it into planning framework, and it won't work.

SS: Kind of like the old days? NJ: Yes. The aquatic conservation strategies are another example, okay? And so, that is a major lesson of FEMAT, it really is, that managers can't do it on their own. They can't just take the science, whether it's domesticated or wild, and figure out how to weave their goals into a framework that incorporates this.

SS: Especially now that all the laws from the post-environmental age are intricately intermeshed into our political and legal framework. I mean, you can't just unweave that just because you want to not do it any more.

NJ: Yeah. That's right.

SS: I mean, it's hard, but you can't just completely take it away, correct?

NJ: That's right. No, it's right. Now, on to your question about what happened after FEMAT. We were sent home. The Clinton administration got very concerned that they might not pass muster with the judge.

SS: Dwyer?

NJ: With Judge Dwyer, because they couldn't say they had protected all the invertebrates and the red tree vole, because we didn't know much about them.

SS: Dwyer wanted to know about these other creatures, too? Correct?

NJ: He knew nothing about this.

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: At this stage.

SS: I wasn't sure.

NJ: No. It's not like he asked about them. No, it hadn't gone back to Dwyer.

SS: Okay.

NJ: They wanted to craft something where they could say they protected everything. Now, none of these were threatened and endangered. None of them. He just didn't know about them. Again, you're going to assume the plan will protect 02:34:00them until you learn otherwise, or you're going to assume it won't and have to use special features. They decided to go to this approach. The people that did it, many of them scientists. But they were scientists, and they got people that had expertise for these creatures and some others, and basically created an additional layer that changed it from an ecosystem plan to a species plan.

SS: And that's the fine-filter versus the coarse-filter thing?

NJ: Yeah, the coarse filter and the fine filter. The fine filter was for all these species. Now, what did it really impact? Because that also came through 02:35:00various political settlements. What that really impacted, thinnings exempt, was the remaining mature and old growth. So, that really was the death knell of doing that kind of harvest.

SS: Keep going along where you were.

NJ: Well, there is no question, we were disappointed with the addition of "survey and manage," in part, because we didn't think it was consistent with the philosophy of the plan, which was really an ecosystem plan.

SS: Basically, the coarse-filter, landscape-level.

NJ: Right.

SS: Save enough stuff, but you've got to have some freedom to do other things, correct?

NJ: And these species were not known to be in trouble, and they didn't take enough of a reduction in harvest in terms of protecting these species. On the 02:36:00other hand, our latest ecological forestry ideas talk about leaving the mature and old growth alone. Survey and Manage, and the red tree vole, indirectly assisted in that. Maybe it would have been stopped anyway. But the national forests, realizing they couldn't implement the harvest schedule with FEMAT, they shifted mainly to thinning in plantations. The national forests have, depending 02:37:00on where you are, another 20-30 years of that. They don't have the notion of FEMAT that you would have sustainable timber harvest levels forever, long-term, sustained-yield. That idea is pretty much gone.

SS: How do you think that the timber industry, especially regarding retrofitting mills for different sized logs and forest products broadly speaking, has adapted to this lessened yield regime, and for what it is?

NJ: Well, over here on this side of the mountain [the "wet" west side of the Cascades], what they've adapted to is private wood. By and large, the federal timber is bonus wood, as you can't depend on it.

SS: So, they basically have to go to something else. And they say, oh, wow, we got manna from heaven, but we never can expect that, right? NJ: They can get 02:38:00some, but there's private wood which is how most of the mills are set up, mini-mills like Seneca's mill north of Eugene.

SS: Aaron Jones' mill.

NJ: They can take either, as their mill is set up for private wood or federal wood that's the same size. It's almost all from thinnings. The federal wood is not making the unique contribution to industry it used to with old growth. Not anymore. It's just your common, ordinary, mill-run wood. At that time, we had a crisis across the region felt by political leaders. They realized the regional 02:39:00economy is going to keep growing, but this is also about local community dynamics. Now, it's pretty isolated. I mean, it's includes Sweet Home and Oakridge, communities that have never recovered. But we don't have the sense of economic crisis related to federal timber we used to over here. Over in eastern Oregon, especially way over into John Day country, it's different. But over here, there is just not the economic crisis based in dependence on federal timber.

SS: Well, because you have urban cores. And other things that support the economy. The places over there are different?

NJ: That's right. And look at Philomath, they used to have ten mills when I was a grad student. Now it has one. Philomath, of course, is now a bedroom community of Corvallis. And so much was very traumatic. There was an economic calamity for 02:40:00the communities. Many of them have moved on, some of them haven't. But we just don't have that sense of things hanging on the federal timber.

SS: Now, do you think even in whatever scenario going forward, that administrative executive action can overturn these things, and things can start going back to the way they used to be, in limited doses anyway?

NJ: Let's see, are things going to roll back? What's going to happen? I believe 02:41:00I'm pretty confident of this. Ironically, just like in 1992 when candidate Clinton came to Eugene, and said at a rally down there that included people that worked in the timber industry, likely mill workers, he said, "I'm going to fix this." Meaning, the spotted owl difficulties and the whole injunction. "I'm going to fix this." And here, Donald Trump comes to Eugene and says, "I'm going to fix this." So, he did say, I'm going to increase the timber jobs.

SS: You're talking about when he spoke at the fairgrounds in Eugene?

NJ: I don't know where he spoke, but I know is what he said.

SS: It was at the Lane County Fairgrounds. My friends went to protest. NJ: But I don't think that's where the Trump administration has their heart. They are on other things, like opening up the federal lands for gas and oil. But they will sign anything like that which comes from Congress. Again, we're going to try to define the uniqueness of the O&C lands, basically pull them out in some sense, of the Northwest Forest Plan, although the main way in which they'll be 02:43:00different than the Northwest Forest Plan, is that younger stands now being thinned will be available for clear-cutting.

SS: Is that a fair trade-out, considering everything, and the fact that the counties are so strapped for money because a lot of the traditional receipts they were getting all those years, are just almost gone?

NJ: I've never been happy with the idea of a special mandate [O&C lands], but in the last five years as this has bubbled up again about the O&C lands, I've come to realize they do have a different mandate. In FEMAT, we just treated them all the same. I don't know if it's fair or not. I mean, the counties do have very low property taxes. So, there's something going on there. I think we're going to 02:44:00go through that. But I'm not sure they can get through that without having some modicum of ecological forestry.

SS: So, they just can't go, oh, we're just going to do it the way it used to be and just blade it flat [clear-cuts]. Right?

NJ: I think that will be difficult, first, for our senators to absorb, for our governor who has a say in it, and for just people in Oregon. This includes the downstate counties where there was a survey done. By a combination Democrat and Republican pollsters, two or three years ago, they were asked what choices they wanted. You can have industrial practices on the O&C lands, or you could have ecological forestry practices that would be more protective of wildlife and fish, and get a quarter of the county receipts. Which would you like? All 02:45:00Oregonians were asked, including the people in the downstate counties. They gave the same answer.

SS: Which was?

NJ: We want ecological forestry.

SS: Because?

NJ: Because they don't like industrial. It's not good to look at, it's not good for hunting, not good for fishing.

SS: It spoils waters for the fisherman?

NJ: And there was no distinction between Republicans and Democrats.

SS: How interesting.

NJ: So, I'm not sure about the people in downstate counties if you get past the county commissioners.

SS: You're talking about Josephine and Curry? [Counties in southern Oregon]

NJ: Douglas, yeah. [County north of Curry and Josephine, Roseburg-Cty. seat]

SS: Douglas, right.

NJ: What they want there, and I think there may be a need to at least "paper it over" with ecological forestry, which means some retention and some recognition of diverse early seral. I'm just convinced we're going to see legislation. Previously, the environmental community said that will never happen, so we're 02:46:00ignoring that. And Andy Kerr [environmental activist], when he supported Wyden's bill I was involved with Franklin on concerning O&C lands, he warned that, "You guys will be real sorry if Trump's elected and you see what happens to these lands." Well, it's happening. I think the main thing that the Trump administration will do is rescind the legislation. I think the energy for it will come from the national forests, and for the O&C lands, from our local people and folks in the House. But they're going to have to get by the Senate.

SS: Filibuster possibility?

NJ: Yeah. I don't know where Senator Wyden stands. I haven't talked to him, and he hasn't talked to me lately. But on the national forests, it would not be so much as changing the Northwest Forest Plan, as potentially cutting off public 02:47:00protest under certain conditions, such as if a collaborative group approves. And that will come from Cathy McMorris-Rogers from Washington State, and our own congressman.

SS: What do you mean cutting off public protest? What do you mean by that?

NJ: If a collaborative group agrees to it, you can't litigate it. That's a real "third rail" for the environmental groups. It's cutting off their access to the courts.

SS: Yeah, that's what I was going to say.

NJ: On the O&C lands in the Walden legislation, they said, this is enough for the spotted owl, no matter what. Now, just let me say, they do reserve the older half of the forest. So at least, we have permanent reserves for the old growth. It's not all bad.

SS: Can you see a complete overturn of the Northwest Forest Plan?

NJ: You know, this was tried by the second Bush administration. And the trouble 02:48:00with it is, it's a lengthy process. You just can't withdraw regulation on all this. You've got to go through a planning process and have some justification. As long as the Endangered Species Act is in place, I don't see an overturning of it.

SS: Can you see them taking that away?

NJ: No.

SS: Not without getting rid of the filibuster rule?

NJ: Oh, and there's a lot of support for it. This stuff on protecting species is not a partisan issue when you get out in the hinterland.

SS: Okay.

NJ: Now, in terms of Republicans and Democrats, it's not that. So, regarding the Northwest Forest Plan, if it's overturned, that would be the result of overturning some of our fundamental environmental laws. If they're still in 02:49:00place, no, it won't be overturned. It just won't. Thank you for asking me that, as I hadn't thought about that lately.

SS: I just I think it's an obvious question considering the era we're entering.

NJ: Yeah.

SS: I mean, this is unchartered territory.

NJ: No, but what we don't know is whether the regional office [Region 6] wants to overturn the Northwest Forest Plan. They seem to want to go back to individual forest plans [done by each national forest].

SS: You're talking about PNW?

NJ: No, I'm talking about Region 6.

SS: Region 6, excuse me. And so, we'll see.

NJ: So, at any rate, but I do think BLM is going to be given a special deal. What that does is it puts increased pressure on the national forests to protect species. That was clear in the Dwyer Decision.

SS: So, regarding the BLM, what do you mean by special deal? NJ: They're be under legislation which will mandate more timber harvest.

SS: Okay. So you do think that's going to happen?

NJ: That is going to happen. I really think it is.

SS: Yeah, and that will be both on the west side and the east side?

NJ: Well, they're not really on the east side except Klamath Falls, the BLM.

SS: Okay.

NJ: No, they're not over there.

SS: Okay.

NJ: But I think it is going to happen and fairly quickly. In fact, congressional staffers are already talking to me, and we're trying to figure it out.

SS: How would you describe the follow-up process [to NWFP] in terms of monitoring, assessment and reassessment? You can take any subjects you want. Please just generalize about the whole thing.

NJ: You mean, what happened?

SS: In terms of how you feel the schematics and the plan [NWFP] and the monitoring follow-up, and how it's been assessed and reassessed as it's been implemented and unfolding, over 5-10-20 years?

NJ: Well, I think in terms of monitoring the key ecological variables, whether 02:51:00it's old growth, owl habitat, or aquatic ecosystems, it's done quite well. I think the analysis has never been fully forthcoming on what was expected out of the harvest, and how much was gotten. I think that, continually, it's been shaved and fixed and minimized, the fact that they're not meeting it.

SS: You think that they have tried to put a pretty face on the disastrous aspects to the economy?

NJ: Well, no, I wouldn't say that. But, I believe that may be what happened is that this was a promise by the President [Clinton]. Now, you can say, no, it 02:52:00isn't. It was this harvest level.

SS: And it was not met.

NJ: It was not met. And yet, then they changed it [harvest levels], so now we can't. But there's always been a notion, there is no regeneration harvest. [Refers to "regeneration" of Douglas-fir, which once was thought to mean clearcutting] So, this is not real regeneration harvest, and that's part and parcel in keeping this going. I don't think that's been acknowledged.

SS: And it needs to be to make sure this is viable in 10-15-20 years?

NJ: Yeah, to be honest and fair. And so, it has turned into sort of a lopsided monitoring analysis. Very good on the ecological side, not so good and forthcoming on the economic and social side.

SS: That's been my impression in talking to people. I sense minimizing and 02:53:00avoiding. Would that be a fair assessment?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: What does the barred owl teach us about the limitations of proactive management regarding humans and nature? In other words, playing God while Darwin and natural selection is ultimately the boss?

NJ: But that's not a Northwest Forest Plan question.

SS: No, but it's related.

NJ: Did you add that one? How'd that one get on there?

SS: It's in here. I just didn't ask it earlier.

NJ: Well, one of the things the barred owl teaches is that you should always be humble about whether or not you finally got it right, and how you framed the problem. Because the Northwest Forest Plan missed that. That teaches us is that 02:54:00we've messed a lot with this landscape. We should not expect the ability to sustain species of interest with continued human intervention. This is not natural selection. That's not what's going on here. We have engineered a landscape that is and has been very receptive to barred owls. So, while they may have been here eventually and at these numbers, we've helped. We're living in a human environment. That's what the Anthropocene and all this discussion is. We 02:55:00are just fortunate in this case that we are able to counter this problem. I mean, the [U.S.] Fish and Wildlife [Service] is having overwhelming success with their barred owl experiment. So, we ought to get used to it. We're living in a human-dominated world, that's a species of interest, and we've probably made it harder for it to survive, but we've got to step in. But in this case, we can on a continuing basis, change the power relationship.

SS: What is the most important reason for having created and implemented the 02:56:00Northwest Forest Plan, in your view? NJ: It enabled a very wide community to understand forests and their functioning better than ever before. It really has been an amazing educational device.

SS: And isn't it true that almost even maybe more than in North America, a lot of other countries have watched what happened during this process?

NJ: Oh, yeah, yeah.

SS: Any examples that you can cite?

NJ: No, because I don't keep track. But I think that's right. It's very hard when you're in the middle of it to understand significance. But it's like when, 02:57:00and this is in another vein, but somehow we were talking to Bruce Babbitt once in Union Station in Washington, D.C. He said, "This was the major environmental accomplishment of the Clinton Administration, the Northwest Forest Plan." It really was. It's so significant and has filtered out into people's thinking, that it's hard to understand its uniqueness any more. I think it is. But it really was, with the planning framework and its consideration of the forest and ecosystems, a milestone accomplishment. Even though, if you measure it by the metrics of the immediate issues, saving the northern spotted owl, keeping the timber harvest going, it didn't do so well on either one of them. But in the 02:58:00broader view, it's really a magnificent accomplishment.

SS: I'd like to get a couple comments about certain people that you worked with, just kind of like short statements on the main players. First, Jack Ward Thomas, could you make some comments about Jack.

NJ: I'd follow Jack Ward Thomas anywhere. He was just a fabulous leader. And as I told him, he does his best work when mad and upset. (Laughs) No, he's a grand leader. That's why so many of us hung in there. He is just a wonderful leader and I'm so sorry he got hit by that terrible illness. He's the coolest guy and was always good to me. But he would test you. And then, if he thought you passed 02:59:00the test, he believed in your forever.

SS: John Gordon?

NJ: John Gordon is somebody I never want to be on the other side of an argument from. Because I can't win it. John Gordon could convince the birds to come out of the trees. And he has a wonderful sense of humor. He also has the ability to step back and understand, to pull together in a summary way, as he did here, a lot of disparate ideas, and to really understand the larger meaning.

SS: Jim Sedell?

NJ: Jim Sedell was a real close friend of mine, I feel. Jim was a sweet guy, but 03:00:00he did not seem to have real ideological armament that would prevent him from considering your point-of-view. He seemed always willing to hear and learn from anyone he encountered. I thought that was a really good trait. Plus, he has more energy than six of us, but you know Jim.

SS: Gordon Reeves?

NJ: Reeves? Another close friend of mine, I feel. Reeves is someone who, let me just think for a minute how to say this. He is one of the most difficult people 03:01:00to discourage of anyone I've met. When he believes something - he follows his science anywhere, criticism does not weigh him down, and he just keeps going. He has a unique background because he was once a commercial fisherman.

SS: He told me that.

NJ: And so, he has a love of these creatures, the fish, and he really thinks deeply and then pursues the implications and conclusions of his thoughts. And nobody can deter him, including anybody in a bureaucracy. He's really 03:02:00impressive. Lately, then and now, he will never moderate what he says to make somebody happy or to agree with somebody. He will not.

SS: Eric Forsman?

NJ: Eric Forsman. First, I just want to say something about Sedell and Reeves together.

SS: Oh, okay.

NJ: Again, the invention of the Aquatic Conservation Strategy, is a magnificent intellectual achievement. It just rippled out everywhere. It's the gold standard.

SS: So, you think that's maybe the aspect of this that's maybe being used and modeled elsewhere, more than any other one, is from this plan?

NJ: I think so. In terms of Eric Forsman, Eric Forsman is a field biologist more 03:03:00than a modeler. He is by far the most credible person to talk about the northern spotted owl or about the red tree vole or any of the species he studies. It's not too much to say, we wouldn't have had Alternative 9 without him. There was some resistance from other folks that had worked on the owl in the ISC Report, but he was willing to assist in developing Alternative 9 as to how it fit with a northern spotted owl strategy. He was the key player in helping Franklin. I've always appreciated that, that he was so willing to assist us, even though we 03:04:00ended up with a little different plan than what he intended. If they're going to make a movie about somebody in this [NWFP] adventure, it'll be about him, with Harrison Ford as the lead.

SS: He'll play Eric, huh?

NJ: Yeah.

SS: But Harrison's too old now.

NJ: Well, he is, but Eric's getting old, too.

SS: Yeah, I know, but I mean, the Star Wars remakes, because they look so old and were not nearly as good. Anyway, Marty Raphael?

NJ: I don't know Marty very well. He seemed more reserved and within, really deeply within, the ecological perspective. And he wasn't much involved in trying to link all this together. He's a great scientist, though.

SS: Anyway, Jerry Franklin.

NJ: Well, Jerry and I are very close friends, as you know. One more thing regarding Jack, mainly in terms of FEMAT. Jack provided the overall leadership to make it all work, and to deal with all the federal and political stuff coming at the group. Franklin provided the optimism and the inspiration for enabling us to get a plan that was acceptable to the administration, at least the ecosystem 03:06:00plan. So, he provided optimism and inspiration. Never forget that. I mean, we're working day and night. And I saw him coming along the street in the morning, he was just whistling. He was so happy. Nothing would weigh him down. And he has this credibility with almost all scientists. It's kind of remarkable.

SS: Well, he was the first executive director of the LTER network, and his credibility is found across many spectrums.

NJ: Yeah, and so it was. His merely saying things, then and now, causes people to accept them, where they wouldn't necessarily accept them from other people. And so all of that, you've hit with the people you have named, you've got the 03:07:00really, the important core group of FEMAT. They're the ones there, you've got them.

SS: I only wish that I'd been able to interview Jim and Jack. [Both men died shortly before the Northwest Forest Plan Oral History Project began.]

NJ: Yeah.

SS: And ironically, I believe they both died of the same illness?

NJ: Yeah, they did.

SS: Pancreatic cancer, correct?

NJ: Yeah, it's too bad you didn't have that possibility. These are all strong personalities, and in the end, it all worked out. And many of us have stayed pretty close through the years, and are still working together.

SS: That's cool. Any last comments about the plan or the experiences or something you hadn't brought up?

NJ: Only that I wouldn't have missed it for the world.

SS: And with that note, we will sign off. Thank you, my friend.

NJ: Okay. Sure.

SS: Great interview. Thank you.